Three Essays on the Empirical Analysis of An Authoritarian Political Regime by Li, Yanjun <1990>
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna 
 
 






Settore Concorsuale:   13/A1   
 













Coordinatore Dottorato     Supervisore 
 
 










Esame finale anno 2019 
 
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the origins and the functioning of the
authoritarian political regime in China.
The first essay “Historical Roots of Political Stability” seeks to understand the
historical determinants of political stability by investigating the role of deeply-rooted
centralized bureaucracies and the unified political system in ancient China in shap-
ing interactions between citizens and the state. To avoid the possibility that the
negative relationship between historical centralization and contemporary events re-
flecting political instability may be spurious, we control for a rich set of covariates
and employ an instrumental variable approach. The results show that past exposure
to centralized empires significantly improves present-day political stability: one addi-
tional century in the timing of exposure leads to a 3.4% decrease in anti-government
attacks and reduces anti-government protests by 6.6%. We find that the persistence
of local institutions with their well-respected administration cannot fully explain the
results, while nationalistic culture represents the main channel through which the
impact of a long-gone institution persists.
The second chapter “Political Tournament and Political Outcomes” analyzes how
the political competition in an authoritarian regime a↵ects the level and the composi-
tion of local public expenditures. In a performance-based promotion mechanism that
rewards short-term investments, we show that Chinese prefecture leaders make dif-
ferent policy decisions based on the local competition level within a career-concerns
model. Where there is a trade-o↵ between two kinds of public input, these lead-
ers choose the input which maximizes their own career prospects. After exploring
various mechanisms and examining variation in the sudden death of competitors as
an instrumental variable used for identification, the evidence gathered suggests that
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local o cials spend more and prioritize short-term over long-term investments when
they have fewer potential competitors, translating to a higher probability of being
promoted. We find robust support for the model’s predictions using various sources
of data and several outcome variables.
The third chapter “Political Competition, Economic Spillovers, and Uneven Spa-
tial Development” extends the discussion in the second essay and examines how
political competition, along with the positive economic spillovers of public provi-
sions, a↵ect the spatial distribution of public inputs and economic outputs within
jurisdictions. Using annual data from prefectures in China, we find evidence of an
increased border e↵ect on the nighttime luminosity, which approximates increas-
ing economic disparities between center and border regions within a prefecture in
response to an additional e↵ective political competitor in an adjacent jurisdiction.
This occurs through politicians’ strategic allocation of public resources which are dis-
tributed away from the cross-jurisdictional boundaries when the concerns regarding
spillovers raise. The findings are consistent if we instrument endogenous political re-
placements with politician sudden deaths. These e↵ects are confined to the provincial
borders; contestants from neighboring provinces do not lead to such spatial patterns.
Moreover, the border e↵ects are amplified when the competing neighbors are closer
in political and economic ranking. These pieces of evidence suggest that relative
performance evaluation (RPE) is an essential mechanism for achieving policy goals
in China.
Keywords. Persistence; Centralization; Historical empires; Culture; Political sta-
bility; Political competition; Tournament; Public expenditures; Spillovers; Spatial
distribution; Border e↵ect; China; Chinese economy.
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Chapter 1




Growing pieces of evidence indicate that history generates long-lasting e↵ects
on modern economic growth either through its impact on formal institutions, in-
cluding financial, legal institutions, etc. (e.g., North, 1990; La Porta et al., 1997,
1998; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001), or on beliefs, social values, and
cultural norms (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2016). There is an increasing num-
ber of research papers in the field, with some placing greater emphasis on institutions,
and others focusing more on culture. Nevertheless, all those works attempt to link
the negative consequences of depraved institutions or cultural norms to economic
⇤I am indebted to my supervisor Paolo Masella for his guidance. I am grateful to Anastasia
Arabadzhyan, Vincenzo Denicolò, Maria Bigoni, Matteo Cervellati, Margherita Fort, Tzu-Ting
Yang, Kamhon Kan, Guang-Zhen Sun, Daigee Shawn, Wan-Jung Cheng, Colin L. Xu, Chao Chen
for constructive suggestions and the seminar participants at the University of Bologna and Academia
Sinica for their comments. Thanks to CSC (China Scholarship Council) for financial support. All
remaining errors are my own.
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underdevelopment in a long run.
On the contrary, some topics, such as the endogenous interactions between culture
and institutions and the way in which institutions lead to negative consequences
through an unwittingly created culture, have not yet been thoroughly investigated
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).
This paper exploits China’s millennium-long centralized authoritarian monarchy
(in Chinese, zhuanzhizhuyi zhongyangjiquan) to analyzes the e↵ect of a past institu-
tion. It was not only the most enduring political regime across the history of China,
but also the most far-reaching one, as it enlightened the authoritarian rule of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in modern China.
The monarchical centralism which starts with the Qin dynasty (221 BC) and ends
with the Qing dynasty (1911), lasting for more than 2,000 years, was designed to
concentrate the state power in the hands of the emperor and the central government.
It ended up the period of frequent conflicts and wars among several powerful feudal
states (i.e., Warring States Period) and ensured a better administration of the local
authorities and people at the grass-root level; as such, it historically assured political
stability. Meanwhile, one can observe a change in the locus of allegiance and loyalty,
which shifted to the states and their emperors after Qin (221 BC), when the first
centralized state was founded. Ordinary people in the centralized states developed
a deep sense of attachment to their states, and of trust and obedience towards the
rules of the emperor and the central authorities. This was not only because, under
this new system, the people believed the emperor to be the only one with divine
rights, but also because a centralized regime was better at helping the population
organize small-scale production. When such a culture was formed and transmitted
from generation to generation, contemporary obedience to the state and a sense of
nationalism are maintained. These “cultural” variables that could be correlated with
the historical experience of centralized states, intrinsically suppresses the potential
instability and revolts against the central authority. Therefore, this paper seeks to
understand the influence of deeply-rooted centralized autocratic monarchy in ancient
China on contemporary outcomes, and whether the persistence occurs through an
intergenerational transmission of pro-national attitudes.
A series of studies has investigated the long-term consequences of centralized
10
statehood on modern economic development. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013,
2015) examine how the pre-colonial political centralization, defined by the number
of jurisdictional hierarchies, conditioned the long-run development in Africa. An-
geles and Elizalde (2017) report a strong positive correlation between pre-colonial
statehood and sub-national economic outcomes for Latin America. Meanwhile, Wahl
(2017) attributes the roots of European development to the centralized Roman em-
pire, using evidence from the German Limes. Besides the focal point on sub-national
development, another strand of literature focuses on the cultural outcomes of politi-
cal centralization. Becker et al. (2014) suggest that a historical Habsburg a liation
increased current societal trust, a↵ecting the interactions between citizens and the
authorities. Lowes et al. (2017) compare respondents from the former Kuba King-
dom with those from just outside the Kingdom, showing that centralized formal
institutions are linked with weaker rule-following norms and a higher propensity for
cheating. Buonanno et al. (2018) document that tax compliance is higher in Ital-
ian municipalities that belonged to medieval republics. In line with the previous
works, our paper contributes to the literature by examining the consequences on the
institutional side, namely sub-national political stability.
Political stability symbolizes the integrity and durability of a regime. A regime
is considered stable if the ruling government and its agencies are supported by the
population and do not experience strong indicators of social upheavals. In contrast,
revolutions, terrorist attacks, as well as public protests, demonstrations, and vio-
lence are associated with political instability. It is worthwhile to study the levels of
stability of a current institution for the following reasons. First, as Alesina et al.
(1996) suggest, political instability reduces investments and the speed of economic
development, which in turn can cause more severe instability. To avoid stepping into
such a vicious cycle of underdevelopment, the exploration of the roots of political
instability is necessary. Secondly, studies in political science have argued that social
instability accelerates the process of democratization (Hollyer, Rosendor↵, and Vree-
land, 2015). However, China’s regime shows no sign of collapsing anytime soon. This
paper provides an explanation for the solid authoritarian resilience in China. Last
but not least, the ruling party’s suppression of dissent incurs substantial economic,
political, and moral costs. Our study of this particular outcome thus has some prac-
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tical implications in better allocating public resources in preventing social unrests.
In the aspect of outcome variables, We contribute to the measurement of political
instability at small local units (i.e., counties), by counting the occurrences of specific
events, such as anti-government armed attacks and protest, within the county-level
administrative boundaries. The information used comes from some novel data sets.
To examine the historical roots of political stability or instability, we draw upon
cross-sectional data on regional variation in the past exposure to centralized state-
hood. In 221 BC the first emperor Qin Shihuang, established the first centralized and
unified state in China’s history. The Central Plains, inhabited by the Han majority,
were transformed from a loose confederation of feudal states to an authoritarian em-
pire. From 221 BC to 1911 AD, a series of imperial dynasties emerged, expanded,
and then disappeared with their irregular cycles in the Central Plains region, which
represents China proper. To the north of China proper were the nomadic regions
of Inner Asia, inhabited by nomads who relied on growing forage. The nomadic
confederations, whose form of government was strictly di↵erent from that of the Han
centralized states, were characterized by their decentralized power divided over sev-
eral tribal leaders, and by loose alliances, having a separated military and taxation
system. During the imperial period, the area of contemporary China was divided
into the aforementioned two regions. In between themselves, there was always a
moving boundary; as one fell, the other one rose; therefore, the coverages of the two
regimes were changing together and over time. This allows us to investigate the geo-
referenced position and coverage of the centralized empires, more specifically their
commandery and county system across history, and systematically build a yearly
graphic panel collecting information of political entities ruling over the period. We
sum up the years of exposure to obtain regional variation in historical centralization
experience, measured by the number of centuries.
The baseline model uses the within-province identification to solve the most severe
issues driven by unobserved heterogeneity. The ordinary least squares (OLS) result
shows that one century of exposure to centralized statehood is associated with a
0.8% decrease in anti-government attacks and a 3.1% decrease in anti-government
protests. The finding does not alter after the inclusion of several socio-demographic
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characteristics,2 geographical covariates,3 and contemporary economic development
indices, such as 2010 luminosity-related data and agricultural feasibility index, policy
triggers,4 cultural factors,5 and historical traits6. Importantly, our result remains
robust to di↵erent sub-samples and weighted historical exposure.
The statehood experience of a county correlates with a complicated series of fac-
tors. We can control for many confounding variables, especially for the historical
settlement patterns and pre-221 BC feudal states that determined the initial state of
the regimes. However, the endogeneity problem occurs when the factors that moved
the boundary between centralized empires and nomadic confederations in the first
place are also simultaneously associated with the political stability. Endogenous cul-
ture is one possible candidate for the omission, which may upward bias the results.
We use weather shocks, that could change the regime boundary exogenously, as a
plausible instrumental variable (IV). In line with Bai and Kung (2011), who conclude
that nomadic incursions into centralized statehood regions were positively associated
with less rainfall while negatively correlated with more rainfall, our first-stage esti-
mation suggests that the southward shift of the boundary is positively associated
with drought. The underlying logic is that, since nomads chose between production
(herding) and looting (from their sedentary counterparts) based on the returns and
costs of each activity, climate shocks could exogenously a↵ect the returns and costs
of the two options to a di↵erent extent. Herding su↵ered more with droughts. Water
shortages lead to a lack of fodder and shortage in meat as the herding output was
null; in such case, the nomads inclined to invade the empires for survival, driving
the regime boundary southwards. The covariates in both stages take into account
the contemporary climate shocks and the smooth change in production patterns due
to past climate changes, to ensure that the historical climate shocks a↵ect present-
2These are logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnicity, average years of schooling,
urban residency, agricultural and industrial employment, Party and state institutions employment,
unemployment status.
3These are elevation, terrain ruggedness, precipitation, distance to the national boundaries,
distance to the coast, and distance to the capital.
4As defined by land revenue, and pollution levels.
5As defined by language groups and number of Confucian temples.
6As defined by shares of agriculture, herding, feudalism, pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities,
and number of historical commercial centers.
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day conflicts through and only through the change in the historical centralization
experience. The instrumented results show that historical exposure to centralization
significantly and positively explains contemporary political stability: an additional
century of exposure leads to a 3.4% decrease in the number of attacks against the
government and a reduced number of anti-government protests by 6.6%; we thus
claim the correlation could be in fact, causal.
In the last section, we examine the underlying mechanism of this persistence. The
inclusion of variables that approximate the accountability and the loyalty of current
local institutions in the regression does not absorb the e↵ect of the past institution
on political instability, indicating that the persistence of local institutions cannot
fully explain the results; it accounts for solely 4-16% of the total e↵ects. Therefore,
we explore a culture channel, which is defined as by breeding particular types of
culture, a past institution may impact upon the behavior of individuals over an
extended period of time (Grosjean, 2011; Becker et al., 2014), and sequentially the
fostered beliefs and social norms would a↵ect recent institutions or economic growth
in a long run.
We use data from an existing survey to capture how culture evolves, namely
the Chinese Political Compass of the year 2009. First we regress the nationalism
indicator on the historical exposure to centralized empires and find out that the long-
gone institution, through the formation and transmission of a culture of obedience to
the state and a sense of nationalism, influenced the nationalistic thoughts and beliefs
of citizens today. After our exploration of a positive association between experience
of centralization and reported sentiments of nationalism, we check if citizens’ higher
level of nationalism is the mediator in between a longer historical exposure and lower
occurrences of anti-state attacks or protests. We then include both the county-level
nationalism indicator and exposure to past centralization as regressors. The results
suggest that citizens’ better psychological support for the maintenance of state power
driven from regional exposure suppresses their participation in rebellion, while the
direct e↵ect of past regimes on political instability becomes insignificantly di↵erent
from zero. The cultural channel, whose mediation e↵ect accounts for 40-65% of
the total e↵ect, is therefore attested: when controlling for the competence of the
local government and bureaucracies, as well as the seriousness of policy-driven social
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problems, citizens in regions with a longer experience of centralization are less likely
to perform armed attacks or protests against the government, since they believe in
the state and government more.
The cultural channel is further confirmed by using individual-level data from
CGSS of the years 2006 and 2010. The results suggest that past experience can
significantly improve the interaction between citizens and states today, resulting in
a higher level of reported confidence in the government and its policies.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In section 1.2 we document the
historical background in the context of imperial China. Section 1.3 introduces the
variables and examines the long-term consequences of centralization on present-day
political instability, whereas section 1.4 determines whether the correlations uncov-
ered could be causal, using an instrumental variable approach. Section 1.5 identifies
the two main mechanisms responsible for the persistence. Section 1.6 concludes this
paper.
1.2 Historical Background
After the slave society of 1045-256 BC, the Zhou dynasty ruled over China, using
a form of government called feudalism to consolidate its control. Western historians
describe this Zhou period as “feudal,” because the power was decentralized and
belonged to aristocratic families which ruled as lords of their principalities.7 There
were many similarities between the decentralized system of the Zhou kingdom and
medieval rule in Europe, such that when a dynasty was established, the conquered
land was divided into hereditary fiefs.
For over 300 years, feudalism kept China stable. However, the increasing power
of the lords broke this system down. As the king sold more of his land, the stronger
feudal states were able to swallow up their weaker neighbors, some lords became
7It is important to mention that feudalism as theorized by Marxist historians is a completely
di↵erent concept. Marxist historians in China have described ancient Chinese society as largely
feudal, since in their opinion a feudal society refers to a social form in which landlords own land and
exploit peasants or serfs. In contrast, feudalism as theorized by non-Marxists refers to a particular
kind of state institutions and form of government. In this paper, we use the later meaning of feudal
and feudalism.
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wealthier and more powerful, forming several huge city-states or feudal states, and
fighting each other for more power, which resulted in the Warring States Period. As
a consequence of the great societal division during this period, philosophers began
to think that feudalism, more specifically the way it decentralized power, had caused
more instability than it had helped in consolidation of the regime, and they started to
influence their rulers against it. The theory of constructing a unified and centralized
authoritarian empire was formed and developed.
In 221 BC the first emperor, Qin Shihuang established the first centralized and
unified empire in China’s history. The Central Plains, inhabited by the Han majority,
were transformed from a loose confederation of six feudal states to an authoritarian
empire. From 221 BC to 1911 AD, which is defined as the imperial China period,
a series of imperial dynasties which emerged on the territory of the Central Plains,
developed, and then disappeared over this period, such as the dynasty of Han, Tang,
etc. In these empires, the emperor would be treated with increasing reverence and
would come to be worshipped as a god. The emperor ruled with the Mandate of
Heaven, the belief that he was only emperor because the gods chose him to be.
The power was concentrated in this unique “god” and his central government, with
multi-level subordinated administrations and hierarchical organizations. This kind of
institution is called an autocratic centralization system (or centralized authoritarian
monarchy/monarchical centralism), and it lasted for more than 2,000 years until the
last empire of the Qing dynasty.
The centralization of bureaucracy in the hands of the emperor was achieved
through a unique organizational form called “the county system (in Chinese, junxian
zhi)”,8 which replaced the feudal organization of the Zhou kingdom based on kinship
and land grants. With a line management model from the central to the local, the
local authorities had no independence on politics, economic and military nor real
power in dealing with important governance a↵airs and local o cials, who were
directly assigned by the emperor, were forced to go along with the emperor and
central authority.
On the territory of present-day China, around the monarchical states and par-
8The full name of the county system in ancient China is the commandery-county system. We
use the county system throughout the paper for simplicity.
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ticularly to the north and to the west of China proper, were the nomadic regions.
During the imperial era, those regions were inhabited by nomads, who relied on
pastures and constant plunder invasions into the neighboring Han empires for sus-
tenance. The best known examples of nomadic groups in ancient China were the
Huns, the Siberians, the Tungguts, the Turks, and the Khitans. The communities
formed various tribal chiefdoms and confederations as their form of governance. The
alliances were characterized by a separation of governmental powers, military, and
taxation. Their power was decentralized and split over several tribal leaders.
In 1911, the fall of the last empire of China, the Qing dynasty, put utterly an end
to the 2,000 years of imperial rule in entire China and the centralized autocratic bu-
reaucracies aforementioned. The Republic of China (ROC) was formally established
on January 1, 1912, following the Xinhai Revolution which successfully overthrew
the last imperial dynasty.9 In 1949, the CCP took control of mainland China and
founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
1.3 Empirical Design
1.3.1 Baseline Model
To examine whether the monarchical centralism has had a long-term consequences
on contemporary political stability, we begin with our baseline estimate of the fol-
lowing specification:
Yc,p =  Exposurec +  Xc,p +  p + uc,p (1)
where c indexes a contemporary county in p province. The dependent variable
Yc,p is an index of the present-day county-level political stability (or instability) as
illustrated in section 1.3.3. Xc,p stands for a rich series of covariates, as introduced
9Therefore, the regional variation in past exposure to centralized empires is only originated from
the period of 221 BC-1911 AD. Some may raise the concerns that whether the whole contemporary
Chinese territory belongs to the ROC after the year 1912. It is confirmed by the Provisional Con-
stitutional Law of the ROC of which Sun Yat-sen presided over the formulation and promulgation
in 1912; it states “The territory of the Republic of China contains 22 provinces, Inner Mongolia,
Tibet, and Qinghai.”
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in section 1.3.4;  p approximates province fixed e↵ects. As the highest layer of
local government, provinces in China are large units across which there is great
heterogeneity. Within-province identification solves the most severe issues related
to unobserved heterogeneity and allows us to compare counties led by the same
provincial government. These counties are therefore exposed to identical macro-
and socio-economic policies, have similar geographical features, and are in a similar
developmental stage.
The key explanatory variable of interest is Exposurec, which measures the length
and intensity of exposure to centralized authorities during 221 BC-1911.
1.3.2 Explanatory Variable
We combine information on the yearly spatial distribution of statehood status
during 221 BC-1911 AD to obtain the regional variation in exposure to the rule of
centralized bureaucracy states in imperial China. Centralization is essentially a po-
litical power system and a way of organization. To identify the levels of centralization
objectively, we thus check through the power structure and organizational form of the
regimes. The autocratic system of centralized authority firmly required multi-level
administrative divisions10 similar to contemporary China from central to local, where
all local units were strictly subordinated to the central one; with this governmental
form, the power was highly centralized. If a region applied this commandery-county
system, we regard it as having been exposed to centralization. This system is com-
pletely distinct from the decentralized and loose confederations: on the one hand,
under such a system the o cials are directly appointed by the emperor, without
being given real power in military and taxation (power structure), and on the other
hand, this system captures enough political complexity, implying that the political
area consists of at least two layers of local government (organizational form).
The boundary between empires with a high level of centralization and nomadic
confederations constantly changed across imperial history, depending on the intrinsic
power of the Han empires in defending their land and on the external forces from the
10The total number and name of layers of local governments vary under the county system over the
imperial history. For instance, there could be two layers of local governments such as commandery
(jun) and county (xian), or three layers such as province (sheng), circuit (dao), and county (xian).
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nomadic territories in initiating the invasion:11 as one fell, another one rose. When
the empire conquered a small tribe and acquired back its territory, the new piece
of territory would be organized into a county under the direct rule of the emperor
(Zhou, 2018). This means that the change in regional coverage of the commandery-
county system coincides with the changing spatial distribution of the centralized
regimes. Therefore, we explore the annual information on the regional experience of
the county system to capture the variation in political centralization.
The source of geo-information on the county system comes from the China His-
torical Geographic Information System (CHGIS V6). The project was launched in
January 2001 by Fudan and Harvard University to establish a database of the his-
torically populated places and past administrative units over the period of imperial
China. Version 6 provides a time-series geo-referencing dataset of all counties that
have ever been built in ancient China, by o↵ering more than 6,000 polygons of coun-
ties with information on their spatial coverage, name, establishment year, and end
year of all the units during our time span of interest.
Firstly, we restructure these polygons into annual maps with a dummy variable.
In each map, we follow the strategy of Buonanno et al. (2018) and assign a value
of one to regions covered by any county polygon existing in that certain year, and a
value of zero to regions belonging to nomadic tribes (i.e., not covered by any of the
former county in that year). This dummy variable could be interpreted as one year of
exposure to centralization; therefore we overlap the maps and sum up the dummies,
to get a raster graphic with continuous values indicating the total number of years of
exposure for all regions. Next, we add the contemporary administrative boundaries
(i.e., county boundaries)12 to calculate the average value of past exposure, rescaled
to a number of centuries, at each current county level. Figure 1.1 plots the average
11Despite being much more numerous than the nomadic populations, it was always the Han
Chinese to defend themselves from others, rather than the contrary. Given that Han culture has
always been a culture based on agriculture, men worked on land and women made fabrics, with a
self-su cient and stable economic structure; while the slow expansions of Han empires were usually
through the penetration of culture.
12We would like to address that this paper contains two concepts of “county”: past counties
(the commandery and county system) and nowadays counties (the administrative level below than
prefecture). We explore past counties only to identify centralization, while exploit contemporary
counties as study units, all variables are thus aggregated to current counties.
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value of past exposure in all counties, while Table 1.1 reports its mean and standard
deviation.
We cross-validate the CHGIS’s data by comparing it to other sources and to the
o cial historical maps. We first digitalize the annual maps from the Historical Atlas
of China and depict all states (including centralized empires, nomadic or Han feudal
states, vassal states, etc.). We assign a dummy variable to each state, which takes
the value of one when the state has a centralized political system; the index equals
zero if it does not. Then, we checked the lifespan and geo-referenced spatial coverage
of these states and built a yearly panel. By overlaying the maps and summing up the
dummies, we obtain an alternative measurement of exposure. The strong correlation
between these two measurements (around 0.81) suggests that the shapefile data from
CHGIS is in accordance with works describing the degree and extent of centralization
in ancient China.
1.3.3 County-level Outcome Variables
There is no standardized way to measure the degree of political stability or in-
stability. Political instability can be measured through either perceptions indices
or objective indices. Perceptions indices contain expert opinions or survey results,
presenting assessments and insights from specific groups on the degree of political sta-
bility in a particular country. These types of indices are usually at the country level,
for example the World Bank governance indicators and ICRG indices. Objective
indices count data on the incidence of certain phenomena, such as demonstrations,
protests, and assassinations. Examples come from Easterly and Levine (1997) and
Annett (2001), who use conflict-containing events to approximate political instabil-
ity. The advantage of the objective method is that, if it is possible to identify the
location of the event, then it is certainly possible to obtain an index (e.g., total count,
or frequency) within a small unit such as a county, a town, or even a smaller cell.
Therefore, we measure county-level instability by counting events sourced from two
new datasets within each county.
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Number of Anti-government Armed Attacks The Global Terrorism Database
(GTD)13 records violent events that have taken place in China between 1989 and
2016. These records include the dates and the geographical coordinates of the at-
tacks, the attack types, the target types, and the identity of attackers. In order
to understand instability from a political perspective, we select the attacks aimed
at separating the country or destabilizing the government and governmental agen-
cies (i.e., governmental bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises). These attacks
include attacks on a government building, on the head of state, on politicians, govern-
ment employees, civil servants, judges, courts, on the army, and on the state militias,
which add up to the 678 attacks used in our analysis. Information on latitude and
longitude helps us match the events to the counties where these attacks took place.
We aggregate each event to the county where it happened, counted the total num-
ber of occurrences between 1989 and 2016 in each county and use a natural log to
avoid the influence of extreme values. The county-level number of anti-government
armed attacks is depicted in Figure 1.2. From the figure, it is visualized that the
northwestern part of China is strongly more unstable than the southeast based on
the raw correlation.14 Its mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values
are presented in Table 1.1.
We admit that in order to have more variations, we have taken an expended
time-span of focus (1989-2016); many time-variant changes (i.e., policies, shocks)
that may occur in each county, correlates with their number of anti-government.
We then divide the chosen events into two sets: those happened in between 1989
and 2000 and those happened between 2000 and 2016, generating two corresponding
measures of instability (i.e., Y 1989 2000 and Y 2000 2016) instead of the previous one
Y
1989 2016. We run regression on both variables and discuss the result in Table A.1.
To test the validity of the variable, we then collapse the objective indicators to
country-level time-series and check whether objective measurements coincide with
13GTD is the most comprehensive public database with information on terrorist behaviors around
the world that took place during the period from 1970 to 2016. The data are available for download
at www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
14It could be driven by many factors, geographic variables for instance, which we explicitly control
for in section 1.3.4.
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the time-series trends of perception indices of China’s politics from the World Bank.15
For that indicator, the World Bank provides information for China between 1996 and
2015. The mean value for China during that period was -0.47 points with a minimum
of -0.66 points in 2010 and a maximum of -0.17 points in 1996. Our aggregated time-
series from the selected events in the GTD coincides with the time-series pattern of
World Bank indicators; the year 1996 had nine attacks, so the least number of attacks,
while the year 2010 had 156 events. The validity of this variable is thus confirmed.
Number of Anti-government Protests From 2012, Not the News systemati-
cally documented daily protests throughout China by gathering information from
online sources and reporting the data on YouTube, Twitter, and other social media
channels until June 13, 2016.16 This included information on dates, locations, on-
line discussion archives, the cause of a protest, the form of a protest, the identity
of protesters, and whether a protest was repressed. We captured 50,141 protests in
total from 2014 to 2015 and match each protest to its location (county).17
In the next steps, we are going to do a text analysis in order to classify protests
based on their motives: aggrieved citizens may protest against the government be-
cause of land acquisition, environmental pollution, or dissatisfaction with the gov-
ernment and the state-owned enterprises; while others may protest against non-
governmental entities, such as private firms. We include only the 6,882 events from
the first category in our analysis. Among the protests aimed at expressing people’s
resentment towards the government, we further categorize their causes into policy-
related causes and policy-unrelated motives. Policy-related protests are mainly land-
related protests and environmental protests, the proportions of which are 73% and
16%, respectively. Policy-unrelated protests refer to complaints against urban man-
agement o cers (accounting for 5% in the dataset), against the regional governments
or the communist party (<1%). The summary statistics of this variable are presented
15The index of political stability from www.theglobaleconomy.com is an average of several indi-
cators from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Political Risk Services, and the World Economic
Forum. These indexes reflect the perceptive likelihood of social unrest, violent demonstrations,
armed conflicts, terrorism, as well as ethnic and religious conflicts.
16The police arrested the founders for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” on June 15, 2016.
17see newsworthknowingcn.blogspot.tw for example
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in Table 1.1.
We admit that the news concerning anti-government attacks and protests may be
underreported due to a series of factors, such as the media exposure of each county.
However, since the counties that were historically more exposed to centralization
tend to be more developed, thus more well-connected to media; and their news are
less likely to be underreported, we believe the failure to capture all events would only
underestimate our final results.
1.3.4 Covariates
To avoid the possibility that the negative relationship between historical central-
ization and the contemporary political instability is spurious, we control for a series
of covariates denoted by the vector Xc,p in the equation (1):
Socio-demographic Characteristics. Terrorist attacks and protests are collective
actions. Collective behaviors could be highly related to local demographic character-
istics, which may be a function of historical socio-economic factors, ethnic conflicts
as well as ethnic integrations. We include the following characteristics in our study:
the logged population, logged number of immigrants18, sex ratio, average years of
schooling, proportion of ethnic minorities, ratio of urban to overall residents, the un-
employment rates, the percentage of agricultural, manufacturing, service-providing
industrial population, and Party and state institutions employees19 to the total em-
ployed population in 2010. All variables are taken from the 2010 County Population
Census Data.
Contemporary Economic Outcomes. As di↵erences in historical prosperity may
18There are several concerns regarding migration we need to address. Firstly, migration in ancient
time was very unlikely. The Great Wall which was at the center of the boundaries between the
nomadic and centralized regions made across-border migration impossible. Secondly, migration at
current time can be brief captured by the covariate: the number of immigrants in each county. We
argue that contemporary migrations can hardly lead to selection bias, since the main determinant
of internal migration in China is income gap (Hare, 2002), while preferences towards Party/state
play trivial roles in migration decisions.
19This includes employees in party-state organs, state-own enterprises and public institutes.
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persist and impact upon political stability today, we control for two contemporary
economic outcomes. First, we use data from satellite images on the average night-
time luminosity for the year 2010, as provided by the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA); this serves as a proxy for the degree of local
economic activities (Chen and Nordhaus, 2011; Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil,
2012). Another variable included is the agricultural feasibility index which approxi-
mates local land suitability for agricultural uses; since agriculture still represents as
the base industry of national productivity in modern-day China. Data is computed
from the dataset of Zabel et al. (2014), which presents the gridded suitability for
the cultivation of main crops.
Climate and Geography. Climate and geography can have a profound and lasting
e↵ect on long-run economic development either through its direct influence or by
means of its interaction with historical events. Therefore, we control for average an-
nual precipitation, average altitude, terrain ruggedness, distance (in kilometers) from
the centroid to the nearest national boundaries, distance (in kilometers) to the near-
est coastline, and distance (in kilometers) to the capital, Beijing. Data on rainfall
is computed from the WorldClim-Global Climate Data. Data on topographic factors
is taken from the Global Digital Elevation Model (DEM v2). Average elevation and
terrain ruggedness is calculated from the mean and standard deviation of elevation
at the county level, respectively. The shapefile data on administrative boundaries
derived from the National Geomatics Center of China enables the calculation of mul-
tiple distances.
Policy Triggers. The analysis should fix the policy-driven social issues and
grievances across the counties. The main policy-related triggers of protests are
land acquisition and pollutant emissions, which together account for 90% of the
anti-government protests as documented in section 1.3.3, and should be explicitly
controlled for.20 Information on land acquisition can be inferred from the land rev-
20The terrorism attacks in China, on the other hand, is generally about ideological and religious
issues, whose policies remain mostly unchanged over time and are not set up by the local government.
Meanwhile, the variables related to ethnicity and religion in the social-demographic characteristics
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enue of county governments, the data of which is taken from the Financial Statistics
of Cities and Counties by averaging the land revenue from 2003 to 2005. For pollu-
tants, we look at air pollution, and use data from the Global Annual Average PM2.5
Grids of 2010, as released by MODIS and MISR Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD).
Regional Culture in a State of Nature. The cultural characteristics of one’s eth-
nicity or race should also be excluded. We employ the language group fixed e↵ects,
as sourced from the Language Atlas of China, to control for unobservable factors and
obtain a within-culture estimation.21 Besides, since Confucianism is the mainstream
philosophic tradition in the Central Plains culture, its distribution may be closely
related to the distribution of the historical empires. We further control for the num-
ber of Confucian temples22 to rule out the possibility that Confucianism itself, rather
than the institution, a↵ects the results.
Historical Traits. We take into considerations the potential issue of a biased
selection into treatment. First, local settlement patterns are strongly associated
with treatment condition: pastoralists (nomads) are generally mobile, di↵used, and
decentralized, and therefore built up decentralized regimes; while for sedentary agri-
cultural communities, farming equipment and production facilities, such as irrigation
systems, are required to be provided and protected by a solid state. Therefore, we
control for observed historical settlement patterns by calculating the share of agricul-
tural activities and herding across the imperial period in each current county. This
information comes from the Chinese Historical Geography Tutorials. We calculate
the proportions of years during which counties were part of agricultural zones. Sec-
ond, the pre-221 BC feudal states status (i.e., feudalism) provides an initial state of
treatment; as the first emperor, Qin Shihuang unified other six feudal states to build
the first empire, therefore, the initial state of centralization coincides with the feu-
dalism in 221 BC. Data is obtained from the Historical Maps of the Warring States
Period produced by the Center for Humanities and Social Sciences from Academia
can fully capture these issues; thus we do not further control for any trigger for terrorism attacks.
21The underlying assumption is that the groups or communities that share the same language,
are very likely to have common culture.
22Information from the website www.chinakongmiao.org
25
Sinica. We assign a value of one to areas belonging to pre-221 BC feudal states, and
a value of zero to the remaining ones. Likewise, covariates which serve as a proxy
for the historical economic prosperity, urbanization rate (i.e., the density of cities,
pre-221 BC and in 1800),23 and historical commercial centers24 are included.
The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of all county-level
variables are shown in Table 1.1.
1.3.5 Baseline Results
The baseline results are reported in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. We begin by using the
logged attacks value as the first key dependent variable in Table 1.2. To provide a
benchmark, we show the raw correlation in column (1) and include province fixed
e↵ects in column (2). In both cases, exposure to centralized political authority has
a negative and highly significant (at the 1% level) e↵ect on the terrorist attacks
targeting government-related buildings or agencies. When we gradually control for
the baseline covariates in columns (3)-(8), we can observe a diminishing e↵ect size,
indicating that the raw correlation causes a downward bias of the estimation. The
estimate, conditional on historical traits, reaches its minimum value in column (8),
indicating that historical agricultural patterns are positively correlated with central-
ization statehood and negatively correlated with instability. This is consistent with
the literature reporting that sedentary agriculture generated more compliant and
stable lifestyles (Edgerton, 1971; Goldschmidt and Kunkel, 1971). The estimate of
the full specification described in column (8) suggests that one additional century of
exposure corresponds to a decrease of 0.8% in armed attacks, accounting for 5% of
the outcome mean.
Another measurement of political instability shows a similar pattern. Table 1.3
uses the log of protests as the dependent variable. The raw correlation between the
two variables is statistically significant with a small size, as reported in column (1).
When province fixed e↵ects are included in the regression, the estimate clearly reveals
that historical statehood experience has a highly significant and negative e↵ect on
23Data is from CHGIS v6
24Data is from Cao (2015)
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present-day protests. As the vector of covariates is gradually included starting from
column (2), the magnitudes of the e↵ect increases, suggesting an upwards bias of
the raw correlation. This means that there are omitted variables that correlate
positively with both the exposure variable and the number of protests. This finding
implies that protests and terrorist attacks are di↵erent in their area of e↵ect: in areas
that are more developed, civilized and democratic, citizens tend to choose protests,
demonstrations, and strikes to express their dissatisfaction, instead of selecting an
extreme and destructive terrorist behaviors. The full specification in column (8)
reports that an additional century of exposure to political centralization significantly
and negatively a↵ects the rate of protests, decreasing it by 3.1%, which accounts for
3% of the mean of logged protests.
1.3.6 Robustness of Exposure Measurement
The estimates above can generate some concerns, such as whether the county
system is an appropriate measurement of centralization. To test this and check our
results’ robustness, in addition to the CHGIS data file, we also use the exposure index
obtained from the self-digitalized maps of the Historical Atlas of China.25 The main
advantage of such digitalized data is that it allows us to include the vassal states
belonging to centralized empires; these territories are dependent on a particular
sovereign dynasty, but are not exposed to the county system. By including these
dependent states into the alternative measurement of exposure, as shown in columns
(1) and (2) of Table 1.4, the robustness of the results can be attested. The magnitude
of the estimates is slightly higher than the one obtained with CHGIS data.
The second concern is that the observed persistence may be driven by the in-
clusion of places such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia, which are
extremely politically unstable. Excluding those provinces does not alter the results,
as suggested in columns (3) and (4). This process equals to keeping only the former
Central Plain areas, as a way to explore the variation on one side of the boundary. As
expected, the size of the inter-correlation decreases but remains significant, further
25We do not use this as our main explanatory variable because it contains our subjective classi-
fication of regimes.
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suggesting that even small variations in centralization can lead to di↵erent intensities
of societal unrest.
Most of the comparisons above are between exposure to centralized empires and
that to decentralized confederations; in such case, the stateless status of some regions
in the early imperial period may confound the interpretation. Therefore, we firstly
exclude the Tibet area, which was only later discovered by the Chinese civilization,
and sum the exposure starting from the Dong Han dynasty (25-220 AD), when
there were no other unexplored areas except for Tibet in contemporary Chinese
territory. The results are shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.4. The magnitude
becomes smaller, indicating that the inclusion of stateless and unexplored regions
overestimates the e↵ect of centralization compared to decentralized confederations
on political stability.
Proximate empires, such as Ming and Qing, should have a greater influence on
contemporary outcomes than remote empires such as Qin and Han, we thus weight
the Exposure variable according to the closeness in time. The exposure dummy in
the year 1911 is given a weight of one, while the annual exposure before Christ all
given a weight of zero;26 other years in between 1 BC and 1911 AD are weighted by
the ratios of the year over 1911.27 Table 1.5 presents the results of the regressions
where the weighted Exposure is the explanatory variable. All estimates remain
significant.
1.4 Causal Identification
A county’s historical experience within a centralized regime was possibly linked
with a complex myriad of elements. Though we have controlled for lots of con-
founding ones, such as the production patterns and initial state of the regimes that
determined the initial prosperity, there are still omitted variables which are simulta-
neously correlated with past centralization intensity, as well as its moving boundary,
and stability today. It would be problematic if the omissions that drive the boundary
away from the initial state correlate with the outcome variables of our study. For in-
26The results do not alter when the years of 221 BC-1 BC are given positive weights.
27For instance, the map of 1000 AD weights 1000/1911.
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stance, less exposed counties may be associated with certain unobserved endogenous
culture: it is possible that some docile communities where people were less conflict-
ual and more easily satisfied were not able to defend themselves against nomads in
the imperial time. If so, we expect an upward bias in the OLS estimation. This may
also be driven by the persistence of other historical traits, such as army forces and
informational networks, although in that regard the direction of the bias is unknown.
To deal with this concern, we employ an instrumental variable approach and
investigate whether and how the regime boundary could change exogenously and
move away from the initial state.
1.4.1 Instrumental Variables
Climate shocks are one source of the exogenous influence on regime boundary.
Bai and Kung (2011) inspire the selection of our instrument by concluding that no-
madic incursions into Han centralized regions (i.e., southward moves of the bound-
ary) were positively correlated with droughts and negatively correlated with floods.
Their incursions moved the boundary and resulted in a contraction of the Central
Plains empires. We attempt to prove in this paper that extreme precipitation can
alter present-day stability only through its e↵ects on regional exposure to centralized
bureaucracies.
Nomads made decisions between self-sustaining activities (herding) and looting
from their sedentary counterparts based on the returns and costs of each activity.
When they produced their own goods, the returns were an increasing function of their
herding output; in contrast, if they looted, the returns were an increasing function
of others’ agricultural output. Drought and flood exogenously a↵ected the nomadic
choices by altering the returns and costs of the two options to a di↵erent extent.
Nomadic production su↵ered more with droughts, resulting in incursions into the
Han empires which were necessary for survival. Water shortages led to a shortage of
fodder and disruption in meat production, making the herding output decrease to as
low as zero. In this case, areas specialized in crop farming could e↵ectively diversify
the risks, producing positive output. Therefore, in the event of drought, nomads
invaded neighboring areas and shifted the boundary southwards.
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Nomadic herding su↵ered less with floods. Since there were few branches of
the great rivers passing through the nomadic pasture lands, herding was almost
una↵ected when the river burst its banks. However, agricultural regions, with their
well-developed river system, were struck during floods. The net returns of looting
thus dropped, since agricultural output decreased and the use of horses in agricultural
regions became ine↵ective. In such cases, no further incursions occurred. However,
the literature findings in terms of the e↵ects of floods on boundaries are mixed.
Chen (2014) finds out an e↵ect of floods on the northwards shifting of the boundary,
indicating that nomads may have decided to give up some of their occupied territories
when the cost of managing the flooded territories increased.
In what follows, we illustrate how the above-mentioned climate shocks interact
with the initial state of a territory in determining its exposure to centralized bureau-
cracy. As mentioned in section 1.3.4, the spatial coverage of the Qin Empire and
nomadic confederations in 221 BC is defined as the initial state of the territory. We
further note that the binary variable Cc equals one for each county c being inside
the Qin Empire in 221 BC, and equals zero if not; while the dummy Nc equals one
for each county c being as part of the nomadic confederations, and equals zero if
opposite. The variable InvDisc represents the inverse distance of the centroid of
each county to the boundary between two regimes in the initial state.
After setting up those variables in the initial state (i.e., in 221BC), we include the
aforementioned exogenous shocks during the imperial period (221 BC-1911 AD). The
sources for the frequency and the spatial information on droughts and floods in the
entire imperial era are the Atlas of Drought and Flood Distribution in China in the
Past Five Hundred Years, and the Hydrological and Climate Dataset of Drought and
Flood Disasters in the Yellow River Basin in the Last 2,000 Years, both edited by
the National Earth System Science Data Sharing Infrastructure.28 We use Droughtc
to capture the frequency of droughts on county c’s nearest boundary, and Floodc to
capture the number of floods on c’s nearest boundary.
28Acknowledgement for the data support from “National Earth System Science Data Sharing
Infrastructure, National Science & Technology Infrastructure of China. (http://www.geodata.cn).
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The first-stage regression is illustrated as follows:
Exposurec,p = ↵1Droughtc ⇥ InvDisc ⇥ Cc + ↵2Droughtc ⇥ InvDisc ⇥Nc+
↵
3
Floodc ⇥ InvDisc ⇥ Cc + ↵4Floodc ⇥ InvDisc ⇥Nc + Zc,p⌘ + vc,p (2)
where Zc,p contains all covariates in the baseline model and all the components
of the interaction terms. Each interaction in the first-stage equation corresponds to
one case illustrated as follow.
In the case that the nearest boundary su↵ered a drought, the nomadic invasions
incentivized by a sudden drop of herding output, drove the boundary from the blue
line to the red one. For the counties located within the empire (i.e., Cc equals one),
as depicted by points A and B in Figure 1.3a, their regime has the possibility to be
a↵ected and to be altered from centralized empire to a loose confederation, such as
the point A in Figure 1.3b; point B is less likely to be a↵ected since it had been
further away from the boundary. Therefore, an increased first interaction term leads
to a lower value of Exposure: ↵
1
is expected to be negative and significant; while
the counties initially situated within the nomadic region (i.e., Nc equals zero) as
exampled by point C in Figures 1.3a and 1.3b can never be a↵ected in the event




If the nearest boundary su↵ered a flood, as shown in Figures 1.3c and 1.3d,
no further invasion occurred according to Bai and Kung (2011) and Chen (2014).
Nomads may either keep what they have or return some territories if they failed in
managing them. Suppose that they give up the occupied land and retreat, the regime
boundary moves from the red line back to the blue one. For the counties located
near the boundary and within the empire in the initial state (i.e., Cc equals one), as
represented by point A in Figures 1.3c and 1.3d, flood may help the empire to re-gain
its control over these areas; therefore, ↵
3
is expected to be positive, either significant
or non-significant conditional on nomadic decisions between retreat or else. For the
counties located within the nomadic region (i.e., Nc equals zero) as represented by
point C in Figures 1.3c and 1.3d, they may or may not be a↵ected by nomadic





We examine the importance of the four interaction terms for regional exposure in
Table 1.6. We explore the first-stage by regressing Exposure on the four interactions,
and find that the direction of e↵ects and the significance levels of the four estimates
fully meet our expectations: The estimate of ↵
1
is negative and statistically highly
significant (at the 1% level), regardless of whether we include all the controls from
the baseline model or not. As shown in column (2), an increase of one standard
deviation (1.151) in the value of the first interaction, results in 440 additional years




are both insignificant. The estimate of ↵
3
in
column (1) suggests that an increase in the value of the third interaction is corre-
lated with an expansion in the coverage of centralized regimes (i.e., higher Exposure)
through the empires’ regained control over some territories. However, when the co-
variates are included in column (2), the relationship becomes non-significant. The
weak e↵ect or non-significance of this coe cient confirms the findings in the litera-
ture that floods could not fully explain the expansion of the Han empire; however,
drought contributed extensively to the incursion to the Central Plains of nomadic
groups. When we restrict the bandwidth to 300 kilometers and then to 200 kilome-
ters, all results remain robust. By excluding counties positioned farther away from
the boundary, the e↵ect is strengthened and amplified, as reported in columns (3)-
(4) of Table 1.6. The F-statistics indicate that our instrumental variables are by no
means weak instruments.
A key concern raised throughout the literature relates to the validity of the in-
struments. The relevance assumption is attested through the results of the first
stage, that ↵
1
is highly related to (at the 1% level) the endogenous variable and the
four interactions have expected e↵ects on the intensity of exposure. In order for our
instruments to be valid, they must also satisfy the exclusion restriction assumption
related to the e↵ect of droughts and flood on the instability today. Particularly, there
is an important strand of literature (Burke and Leigh, 2010; Bruckner and Ciccone,
2011; Dell, Jones, and Olken, 2012), showing that weather shocks also plausibly im-
pact political stability (e.g., democratization and the probability of irregular leader
transitions, etc.) through an exogenous change of national income. Thus the ef-
fects of historical drought and flood may work through other variables, most notably
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current weather shocks and economic outcomes, rather through the past institutions.
However, what we explore is the droughts and floods in each county’s nearest
boundary rather than the weather shocks occurred within the county; this helps us to
resolve most of the threats to the exclusion restriction assumption. For instance, the
economic development of the county throughout the history is less like to be directly
a↵ected by the extreme rainfalls of farther places, in particular the nearest boundary
may be several hundred kilometers away from the county. For violations that may
occur to places near the boundary, we further include current weather shocks, i.e., the
frequency of droughts and floods from 1990 to 2000 in both stages, sources from the
Atlas of Natural Disaster System of China. The inclusion of annual precipitation and
county-level frequency of climate shocks during the period of 1990-2000 in the set of
climatic and geographic covariates allows the exclusion of this channel. To consider
the income e↵ect of weather shocks as suggested by the literature, we run regression of
economic prosperity proxies (the density of populated places and commercial centers,
population size both during and after the imperial period) on the four interactions;
the correlations among which could be rejected at a 10% significance level. Meanwhile
in the stability-focused equation, we always include variables that act as confounding
factors and are a↵ected by weather shocks while having a direct e↵ect on political
stability. To sum up, the concern that our interactions in the first-stage estimation
may be correlated with current weather shocks or income is unsupported.
1.4.2 Instrumented Results
We report the 2SLS estimates in the following two tables. The second-stage IV
estimates are significant, suggesting that the correlations uncovered could represent
causal relationships. The instrumented results strongly support the causal e↵ect of
historical exposure to political centralization on present-day political stability. Table
1.7 reports the IV results on the number of attacks against the government. The
coe cient of instrumented exposure (around 3.4-4.3% in absolute values) is some-
what larger than the OLS estimate (around 0.8-2%), suggesting that the endogenous
Exposure measure underestimates the long-run consequence of historical empires on
contemporary political outcomes. The full specification of our instrumented result
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suggests that an additional century of exposure leads to a 3.4% decrease in armed
attacks against the government in the full specification model, as shown in column
(8) of Table 1.7.
Table 1.8 reports the IV results on the number of protests against the government.
The full specification in column (8) reveals that one additional century of centralized
empire experience reduces the anti-government protests by 6.6%, and the size and
magnitude of the e↵ects are stable regardless of the set of covariates we include.
The strategy of Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) uses selection on observables
to assess the potential bias from unobservables. Denote the estimated coe cient
for Exposure from the regression with a restricted set of control variables (e.g.,
province fixed e↵ects only)  R (i.e., we use the coe cients in column (2) of Tables
1.7 and 1.8) and the estimated coe cient from the regression with a full specification
 
F (i.e., in column (8) of Tables 7 and 1.8). Then, the ratio can be calculated as
| F/( R    F )|. The larger the ratio the better due to two following intuitions: the
smaller is the di↵erence between  R and  F , the less the estimate is a↵ected by
selection on observables, and the stronger selection on unobservables requires to be
(relative to observables) to explain away the entire e↵ect; and the larger  F , the
greater is the e↵ect that needs to be explained away by selection on unobservables.
The influence of the remaining unobservable factors would have to be 5 times
greater than that of the observable factors in determining terrorism attacks, and 32
times larger relative to observables in deciding protests against government in order
to completely explain away the negative relationship between the exposure and both
variables of instability; this is reasonably unlikely.
When apply this strategy to OLS estimates in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, the remaining
unobservables in the error term only have to be 1-3 times larger than the observable
elements in order to explain away the persistent e↵ect; this is much more likely.
Therefore, by exploiting the instrumental variable approach, the identification prob-
lem driven from variable omissions is released to a large extent.
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1.5 Channels of Persistence
In this section, we explore the two possible channels through which autocratic
centralization may have persisted. The first candidate pertains to the persistence
of local institution transmitted across time. In addition, a society’s believes and
views represent the other possible channel. We quantify these possible channels by
including each of our two potential mediators into the equations:
Medc,p =  Exposurec +  Xc,p +  p + ✏c,p (3.1)
Yc,p =  
0
Exposurec + ⇢Medc,p +  
0
Xc,p +  p + ec,p (3.2)
All the settings are the same as those in equation (1). Medc,p proxies each candi-
date of mediators, and   should be statistically significant. Following the literature
(Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010), we exploit the change in the magnitude of the co-
e cient on Exposure estimated from equations (1) and (3.2) as the part explained
by Med. The explained proportion equals 1  | 0/ |, and the larger this proportion
is, the larger the mediate power of each channel of persistence.
1.5.1 Persistence of Local Institutions
The monarchical centralism generated well-functioning and loyal local govern-
ments through the overwhelming power of the emperor and his central government
over local authorities during the imperial time; those local governments had no in-
dependence in politics, economy, and military and local o cials in the government
were appointed and dispatched directly by the emperor and were strictly required
to obey the orders of the emperor and the central government due to their extreme
dependence for resources. As a result, a new central-local relation was thus estab-
lished and developed, and the large-scale of local separatism which had led to the
Warring States Period was driven to its minimum. While in decentralized nomadic
areas, local authorities had real power, particularly in taxation and military, and
did not respond to the needs of the whole confederation; this generated many con-
flicts among nomadic tribes as well as non-responsive local institutions in nomadic
regions. It is possible that the e↵ect of centralization on contemporary outcomes
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works through the performance, both their accountability and loyalty, of the local
authorities, which endures the passage of time.
Accountability to Citizens The prefectures and counties are administrative
units with a certain degree of fiscal autonomy. Although a general direction for
policies is decided by the provincial or prefectural government, the implementation
of these policies and the formulation of local public expenditure vary across the coun-
ties. The local accountability to communities, which was formed through various his-
torical experience, could generate or mitigate anti-government collective behaviors.
Proxies for local accountability include densities of public provisions: roads, schools,
and hospitals of each county; those variables are calculated from the GIS maps de-
picted by the National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geo-information
of China for the year 2012, capturing the amount and the distribution of main local
provisions.
To examine whether the accountability of local institution is transmitted, we run
regressions on the three proxies in columns (1)-(3) of Table 1.9, and find a longer
historical exposure leads to a higher local accountability. In columns (4)-(7), the OLS
results suggest long-term pro-social provision (i.e., density of schools and hospitals)
mitigates the dissatisfaction towards the local authorities. However, conditioning on
each proxy, the magnitude of Exposure e↵ects changes slightly and remains highly
significant; this suggests that the percentage of e↵ect through the public provisions
over total e↵ect is extremely trivial, and equals around 1-6%. When IV is applied,
the ratio is even smaller.
Loyalty of Local Institutions On the other hand, due to the bureaucratization
and politicization of local institutions and the imposition of various programs on them
by the central authority, the loyalty of local institutions to central government may
not be su cient for, may even be antithetical to, their response to the local needs;
thus the central-local relations, particularly the loyalty of locals, should be explicitly
considered. In all sides of loyalty, anti-corruption is probably the most important one
(Hollyer and Wantchekon, 2015). We explore a prefectural-level government-business
relation innocence index to approximate local levels of anti-corruption.
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The data is from 2017 City Ranking by Government-Business Relations, released
by the National Academy of Development and Strategy (NADS), Renmin University
of China. The ranking’s research team has taken two approaches to evaluate the
local levels of “innocence” - government honesty and transparency. We focus only
the index of government honesty, which consists of two sub-indicators: the ratio of
the total number of o cials inspected over the total number of o cials and the ratio
of the number of bribery news over total number of news. The indicator ranges from
0 to 100, and its spatial distribution is illustrated by Figure A.1. We take the natural
log for running regression.
We add the measure of corruption in columns (3) and (5) of Table 1.10; both are
negative and highly significant, lending firm credence to an institutional channel. In
terms of magnitude, a 1% increase in innocence index (i.e., a higher loyalty of local
institution to the central government) is associated with a decrease in the terrorism
attacks of 3% and in the protests of 6%. However, the coe cients of Exposure remain
significant even after controlling for this local authority measure, and the mediation
e↵ect only accounts for 4-16% of the total e↵ect. Both OLS and IV estimation yield
similar results. The facts in both Tables 1.9 and 1.10 suggest that local institution
cannot account for the entire observed persistence.
1.5.2 Cultural Persistence
Culture may also serve as a mediator through which this e↵ect persists. The exis-
tence of a possible culture channel means that, by creating and fostering a particular
culture, institutions may impact upon the behavior of individuals over a long period
of time (Grosjean, 2011; Becker et al., 2015). From the historical background of
authoritarianism, we know that centralization can foster a cult of personality char-
acterized by the worship of the state’s leader and main organs, and it can influence
people’s trust, making them obey the institution holding the general and centralized
power. We expect that these cultural propensities can be transmitted from genera-
tion to generation and thus suppress revolts and instability at their very roots.
As Fernández (2008) documents it, economists have measured culture in three
ways: by using survey data; by looking at second-generation immigrants to isolate
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the impact of culture, holding constant the economic and institutional environment;
and by collecting experimental evidence. To examine whether culture represents
the channel, we look at two sources of attitudinal surveys as follows, focusing on
nationalism, trust and obedience towards the government, respectively.
Nationalism Index Following Lan and Li (2015), we employ information from
the 2009 Chinese Political Compass, a survey which asks participants to appraise 50
statements on a four-point scale, then groups their responses together and evaluates
a participant’s political stance relative to all other participants. Among the 50
statements, four are concerned with attitudes towards national stability, as suggested
by Lan and Li (2015). The investigated attitudes and their corresponding statements
are:
• Assertion of national unity (Gellner, 2009), as measured by the statement:
“National unity and territorial integrity are the interests of paramount priority
for a society.”
• Emphasis on protecting national interests from other countries (Hobsbawm,
1990), as measured by the statement: “Given su cient comprehensive national
power, China has the right to take any measure to protect its interests.”
• Militarism (Posen, 1993), as measured by the statement: “All students, regard-
less of whether they are in college, high school, or elementary school, should
attend the military training arranged by the government.”
• Anti-foreign sentiments (Gries, 2005), as measured by the statement: “Western
countries, headed by the United States, will not really allow China to become
a world-class powerful nation.”
For each participant, we average their four ratings into one nationalism index. Then,
all personal indexes are aggregated at the county level based on the IP address of
the participants, in order to have a county-level measurement of nationalistic culture.
The spatial distribution of the variable is shown in Figure A.2.
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Both OLS and IV results support a strong positive correlation between the years
of exposure to centralized monarchy and the indicator of nationalism, as shown in
column (1) of Table 1.11. By including the county-level nationalism index in the
previous regression as a regressor in columns (3) and (5), we observe that higher na-
tionalistic beliefs of the residents in the county can generate fewer occurrences of at-
tacks and protests against the government; meanwhile, the direct e↵ect of Exposure
decreases almost to zero, and more importantly, becomes insignificant. The medi-
ation e↵ects of nationalism index range from 40-60%, indicating that nationalism
could well-explain the impact of the historical institutions on political unrests, thus
confirming that culture is indeed an important element in our story.
Trust in Government We use information from the 2006 and 2010 China General
Social Survey (CGSS) to explore individual-level cultural traits and more culture
variables. CGSS aims to systematically monitor the changing relationship between
social structure and quality of life in both urban and rural China. Subjective aspects
of the people’s well-being, their attitudes towards those around them, and social
phenomena both at the individual and aggregate levels are found in the dataset.
The sets of questions related to personal attitudes towards state-entities are:
• “To what extent do you trust the central/local government in China?” We de-
fine two ordinal variables named Trust CentralGov and Trust LocalGov, which
take the value of two if the respondent reports trusting the central/local gov-
ernment, one if the individual has a neutral feeling between trust and no trust,
and zero if the individual does not trust the government.
• Trust in governmental agencies and their policies: “Do you think government
agencies are able to solve these problems: rich-poor gap; judgment on social
security; corruption?” Three dummies Trust PolicyPoor, Trust PolicySecurity
and Trust PolicyCorr correspond to each answers, where the value of one rep-
resents trust, and the value of zero represents lack of trust.
• “Do you agree it is always correct to obey the central government?” The binary
variable Obedience Gov directly captures individual obedience and sentimental
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attachment to the central government, coded as one for agree, and zero for
disagree.
• “Do you agree that the most serious social conflict is between cadres and com-
mon people?” The answer to this question is denoted Dissention Gov, coded
as one for agree, and zero for disagree.
Besides the county-level control variables Xc above, we further add a rich set of
control variables at the individual level. The individual-level controls include vari-
ables that are arguably exogenous, such as age and gender, as well as variables whose
e↵ect we would like to separate from any possible e↵ect of the ancient centralized
administrative experience, for example ethnic minority status, and Hukou register
status. The controls further contain variables that may be viewed as endogenous,
such as individual working status, education, religious beliefs, and whether one is
a member of the CCP. The summary statistics for these variables are reported in
Table A.2.
The results consistently show that Exposure has a significant positive e↵ect on
the relationship between a citizen and the government even up to the present day,
when this relationship is defined by a higher level of trust. As shown in the up-
per panel of Table 1.12, respondents from counties historically more exposed are
more likely to trust the central government. Their correlation conditional on a
series of county- and individual-level is around 0.7%, as reported by column (3).
Columns (4)-(6) report the 2SLS estimates, and show that instrumented Exposure
increases contemporary trust in the central government by 2.1% (column (6)). As
reported in the lower panel of Table 1.12, though the regressions on trust in local
government consistently yield similar estimates in the beginning, the e↵ect disap-
pears when county-level characteristics are included. Particularly, the inclusion of
local nighttime luminosity absorbs entirely the e↵ect on trust in local government,
implying whether a respondent reports trusting the local government depends little
on the attitudes transmitted by older generations, but on current local economic de-
velopment. However, this is not a threat to our conclusions, since the persistence of
centralized monarchy only requires a strengthened interactions between individuals
and the central authorities.
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It is thus not surprising that these respondents believe not only in the govern-
ment, but also in its agencies and public policies. Table A.3 reports the corresponding
results, indicating that, in regions that were historically more exposed to centraliza-
tion, the citizens tend to agree more that the government’s agencies are able to solve
the existing social issues. Likewise, the more exposed they were, the more likely the
interviewees obey the government and the less likely they are to show dissent, as
shown in the lower panel of Table A.3.
We address an important issue here, namely the possibility that the results above
are driven by an increased social capital, not by a change in interpersonal interactions
rather than person-state interactions. If this is the case, then the underlying mecha-
nism may be more closely related to the di↵usion of Confucianism, rather than to the
influence of historical institutions on culture. By using variables regarding general
trust as dependent variables, we find no significant evidence that Exposure would
change general trust towards other people, such as the relatives, colleagues, people in
the same town, and old classmate. Table A.4 presents the OLS results, and applying
the IV leads to consistent results.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper exploits novel measurements of county-level political instability to
examine the persistence of centralized empires in China from 221 BC to 1911. The
results suggest that past institutions do influence present-day outcomes from a po-
litical perspective: the e↵ect of political centralization in ancient China persists and
explains the regional variation in political instability. The longer a county was his-
torically exposed to centralized statehood, the less likely it was that anti-government
armed attacks and protests would occur within the county. The correlations esti-
mated by OLS account for 3%-5% of the outcome mean. To avoid the possibility
of endogeneity and claim that the correlation could reflect a causal relationship, we
control for a rich set of covariates and employ an instrumental variable approach.
The instrumented results reveal that one additional century of centralized empire
experience reduces anti-government attacks by 3.4% and decreases anti-government
protests by 6.6%. All findings remain consistent to using di↵erent sub-samples and
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a time-weighted explanatory variable.
In the last part, we explore the channels through which the e↵ect persists. His-
torical experience of centralization on the one hand, generated well-functioning and
loyal local authorities; on the other hand, fostered the general worship of the em-
peror, and influence people’s nationalistic sense, and attitudes towards institutions
holding the centralized power. We find that the latter channel (i.e., deeply-rooted
culture) could account for the majority of the estimated persistence: nationalism,
trust and obedience towards the government which persist to this day, evidenced by
their positive and strong correlation with the intensity of exposure, well-mediate the
e↵ect of the long-gone historical institution on political instability; this contributes
to the literature that past institutions lead to certain current consequences through
an unwittingly created culture.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variables Obs. Mean S.D Min Max
Outcome Variables
Attacks (log) 2306 0.152 0.378 0 2.708
Protests (log) 2306 0.900 0.897 0 3.638
Main explanatory variables
Exposure (centuries) 2306 9.426 7.157 0 21.32
Socio-demographic characteristics
Population (log) 2301 12.93 1.160 8.837 16.92
Immigration (log) 2301 5.055 1.710 1.414 6.942
Sex ratio (%) 2300 105.81 5.663 72.77 160.43
Avg years of schooling 2300 8.257 1.182 2 12.56
Ethnic minority (%) 2301 19.311 31.526 0 99.78
Urban (%) 2301 79.40 13.79 6.340 98.42
Unemployed (%) 2299 0.281 0.073 0.065 0.722
Empl. in agriculture (%) 2301 0.451 0.173 0.003 0.904
Empl. in manufacturing industry (%) 2297 0.120 0.083 0.001 0.542
Empl. in service-providing industry (%) 2300 0.083 0.040 0.005 0.336
Empl. in Party and state institutions (%) 2300 0.018 0.008 0.001 0.031
Autonomous regions 2301 0.276 0.447 0 1
Contemporary economic outcomes
Nightlight density 2306 9.917 9.401 0 63
Agricultural feasibility 2306 183.78 42.97 63.36 255
Climate and Geography
Precipitation 2283 903.77 471.06 32 2399
Altitude 2306 876.45 1113.39 0.223 5150.48
Ruggedness 2306 1066.41 991.84 3 6696
Distance to national boundary 2306 610.67 370.77 0 1430.97
Distance to coastline 2306 708.74 745.73 0 4132.03
Distance to Beijing 2306 621.92 684.64 0 3826.90
Policy triggers
Land revenue (log) 2306 4.338 3.004 0 12.26
Pm 2.5 pollutant 2306 33.83 18.91 1.868 77.30
Cultural variables
Language 2306 7.449 2.251 1 14
Confucius Temples 2306 0.291 0.656 0 6
Historical variables
Share of agriculture 2306 0.713 0.452 0 1
Animal husbandry 2306 0.204 0.403 0 1
Feudalism 2306 0.253 0.435 0 1
Pre-221 BC density of cities 2285 5.80 26.43 0 94
1800 density of cities 2285 15.70 39.87 1 788
Historical commercial center 2306 0.165 0.372 0 1
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Table 1.2: Anti-government Attacks
Log(#attacks+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Province FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demography N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Development N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Geography N N N N Y Y Y Y
Policy N N N N N Y Y Y
Culture N N N N N N Y Y
History N N N N N N N Y
N 2306 2306 2294 2294 2272 2262 2262 2252
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling, urban residents, agricul-
tural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation with autonomous regions; precipitation, elevation,
terrain ruggedness, distance to the national boundaries, distance to the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity in 2010, agricultural
suitability index; land revenue, pollution levels; language groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture, herding, feudalism,
pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.3: Anti-government Protests
Log(#protests+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure -0.009*** -0.024*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Province FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demography N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Development N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Geography N N N N Y Y Y Y
Policy N N N N N Y Y Y
Culture N N N N N N Y Y
History N N N N N N N Y
N 2306 2306 2294 2273 2259 2252 2252 2252
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling, urban residents, agricul-
tural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation with autonomous regions; precipitation, elevation,
terrain ruggedness, distance to the national boundaries, distance to the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity in 2010, agricultural
suitability index; land revenue, pollution levels; language groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture, herding, feudalism,
pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and historical commercial centers.
49
Table 1.4: Robustness of the Exposure Measurement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alternative measurements of exposure Excluding Xinjiang, Tibet, Excluding stateless regions
Including vassal states Qinghai, Inner Mongolia in the first two centuries
Anti-gov attacks Anti-gov protests Anti-gov attacks Anti-gov protests Anti-gov attacks Anti-gov protests
Exposure -0.010** -0.032*** -0.005** -0.025*** -0.005** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007)
Full Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 2252 2252 1931 1931 2065 2065
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling, urban residents,
agricultural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation with autonomous regions; precipitation,
elevation, terrain ruggedness, distance to the national boundaries, distance to the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity in 2010,
agricultural suitability index; land revenue, pollution levels; language groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture,
herding, feudalism, pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.5: Weighted Exposure
Anti-gov attacks Anti-gov protests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weighted Exposure -0.010*** -0.004* -0.007* -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Full Controls N Y N Y
N 2306 2252 2306 2252
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic mi-
norities, average years of schooling, urban residents, agricultural, industrial and
Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation with au-
tonomous regions; precipitation, elevation, terrain ruggedness, distance to the
national boundaries, distance to the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity
in 2010, agricultural suitability index; land revenue, pollution levels; language
groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture, herding, feudalism,
pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.6: First-stage Results
Exposure
All 300km bw 200km bw
Mean S.D (1) (2) (3) (4)
InvDis⇥Drought⇥ C 0.892 1.151 -5.215*** -4.401*** -9.369*** -14.91*
(-4.804) (-3.923) (-3.208) (-1.887)
InvDis⇥Drought⇥N 0.926 2.416 -0.431 -0.019 0.352 0.192
(-0.866) (-0.040) (0.423) (0.129)
InvDis⇥ Flood⇥ C 1.070 1.271 2.419* 1.521 4.751 6.937
(1.791) (1.142) (1.451) (0.784)
InvDis⇥ Flood⇥N 0.837 2.143 0.212 -0.429 -0.576 -1.001
(0.785) (0.490) (-1.148) (-1.434)
Additional Controls - - N Y Y Y
N - - 2147 2147 692 428
F-statistics - - 27.17 38.69 45.13 18.04
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Every components of these four interactions are controlled in both stages.
3
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling,
urban residents, agricultural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation
with autonomous regions; precipitation, elevation, terrain ruggedness, distance to the national boundaries, distance
to the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity in 2010, agricultural suitability index; land revenue, pollution levels;
language groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture, herding, feudalism, pre-221 BC and 1800
density of cities, and historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.7: IV Results: Anti-government Armed Attacks
Log(#attacks+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure -0.010*** -0.043** -0.037* -0.032* -0.041** -0.036* -0.035** -0.034**
(0.002) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016)
Province FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Development N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Demography N N N N Y Y Y Y
Policy N N N N N Y Y Y
Culture N N N N N N Y Y
History N N N N N N N Y
N 2305 2305 2293 2293 2271 2251 2247 2247
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling, urban
residents, agricultural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation with autonomous
regions; current weather shocks, precipitation, elevation, terrain ruggedness, distance to the national boundaries, distance to
the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity in 2010, agricultural suitability index; land revenue, pollution levels; language
groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture, herding, feudalism, pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and
historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.8: IV Results: Anti-government Protests
Log(#protests+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure -0.011** -0.064** -0.055* -0.063* -0.064* -0.065* -0.071* -0.066*
(0.005) (0.025) (0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040)
Province FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Development N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Demography N N N N Y Y Y Y
Policy N N N N N Y Y Y
Culture N N N N N N Y Y
History N N N N N N N Y
N 2305 2305 2278 2272 2258 2251 2247 2247
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling,
urban residents, agricultural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation with
autonomous regions; current weather shocks, precipitation, elevation, terrain ruggedness, distance to the national
boundaries, distance to the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity in 2010, agricultural suitability index; land
revenue, pollution levels; language groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture, herding, feudalism,
pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.9: Institution Channel: Public Provision
Road School Hospital Attacks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: OLS
Exposure 0.0049 0.0169*** 0.0143*** -0.0075*** -0.0074*** -0.0070*** -0.0072***








Exposure 0.0382*** 0.0705*** 0.0536*** -0.0337* -0.0334* -0.0321* -0.0329*







Full Specification Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257
Dep.Var. Mean 3.290 1.684 1.359 0.152
Dep.Var. S.D 0.725 0.849 0.735 0.376
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling, urban residents, agri-
cultural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation with autonomous regions; current weather
shocks, precipitation, elevation, terrain ruggedness, distance to the national boundaries, distance to the coast, distance to the capital;
luminosity in 2010, agricultural suitability index; land revenue, pollution levels; language groups, number of Confucian temples; shares
of agriculture, herding, feudalism, pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.10: Institutional Channel: Corruption
Innocence index Attacks Protests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: OLS
Exposure 0.0153** -0.0075*** -0.0063** -0.0305*** -0.0294***
(0.0075) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Innocence index -0.0271** -0.0647***
(0.0106) (0.0227)
Panel B: IV
Exposure 0.0710* -0.0333** -0.0326* -0.0664* -0.0622**
(0.0394) (0.0160) (0.0198) (0.0401) (0.0300)
Innocence index -0.0175* -0.0547**
(0.0106) (0.0245)
Full Specification Y Y Y Y Y
N 2258 2258 2258 2258 2258
Dep.Var. Mean 3.684 0.152 0.900
Dep.Var. S.D 0.825 0.376 0.896
2
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
3
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling,
urban residents, agricultural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation
with autonomous regions; current weather shocks, precipitation, elevation, terrain ruggedness, distance to the
national boundaries, distance to the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity in 2010, agricultural suitability
index; land revenue, pollution levels; language groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture,
herding, feudalism, pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.11: Culture Channel: CPoC Nationalism Index
CPoC nationalism index Attacks Protests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: OLS
Exposure 0.0466*** -0.0055** -0.0033 -0.0226*** -0.0097
(0.0102) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0086) (0.0085)
Nationalism index -0.0454*** -0.3246***
(0.0071) (0.0210)
Panel B: IV
Exposure 0.0997*** -0.0193* -0.0132 -0.0595* -0.0287
(0.0374) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0341) (0.0328)
Nationalism index -0.0389*** -0.3141***
(0.0080) (0.0232)
Full Specification Y Y Y Y Y
N 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642
Dep.Var. Mean 2.380 0.084 1.082
Dep.Var. S.D 0.977 0.284 0.940
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
Covariates include logged population, logged immigrants, sex ratio, ethnic minorities, average years of schooling, urban
residents, agricultural, industrial and Party/state institutions employment, unemployment, and a liation with autonomous
regions; current weather shocks, precipitation, elevation, terrain ruggedness, distance to the national boundaries, distance to
the coast, distance to the capital; luminosity in 2010, agricultural suitability index; land revenue, pollution levels; language
groups, number of Confucian temples; shares of agriculture, herding, feudalism, pre-221 BC and 1800 density of cities, and
historical commercial centers.
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Table 1.12: CGSS: Trust in Government
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust CentralGov
Exposure 0.009*** 0.008** 0.007* 0.020** 0.015* 0.021*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Trust LocalGov
Exposure 0.016*** 0.013** -0.000 0.033** 0.028** 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023)
Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual Charac. N Y Y N Y Y
County Charac. N N Y N N Y
N 11785 11303 11102 11785 11303 11102
1
Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
The county-level covariates include all variables introduced in section 1.3.4. The individual-level
covariates include the respondent’s age, gender, ethnicity, religious beliefs, marital status, years of
school, employment status, CCP membership, parental years of schooling and parental CCP mem-
bership.
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Figure 1.1: Historical Exposure (in Centuries) to Centralized Statehood
Figure 1.2: County-level Number of Anti-government Armed Attacks
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Figure 1.3: How Exposure Changed Based on a Combination of Initial Regime
States, Initial Distance to the Border and Droughts and Floods on the Boundary
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Table A.1: Di↵erent Set of Events
Log(#attacks+1) Log(#protests+1)
Attacks1989 2000 Attacks2001 2016 Protests2014 Protests2015
Exposure -0.005*** -0.004** -0.002 -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.003





N 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259
Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
1
Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
The county-level covariates include all variables introduced in section 1.3.4.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics Individual-level Data (CGSS)
Variables Obs. Mean S.D Min Max
Outcome Variables
Trust CentralGov 11785 1.850 0.450 0 2
Trust LocalGov 11785 1.479 0.763 0 2
Trust PolicyPoor 10103 0.377 0.485 0 1
Trust PolicySecurity 10088 0.335 0.472 0 1
Trust PolicyCorr 10085 0.390 0.488 0 1
Dissention Gov 21936 0.362 0.481 0 1
Obedience Gov 21159 0.689 0.463 0 1
Main explanatory variables
Exposure (per hundred year) 30034 10.805 6.915 0 21.32
Individual Characteristics
Age 30034 43.468 14.752 13 94
Male 30034 0.470 0.499 0 1
Ethnic minority 30034 0.074 0.261 0 1
Religious 30034 0.106 0.308 0 1
Married 30034 0.892 0.310 0 1
Years of schooling 30034 8.348 4.460 0 22
Employed 30034 0.682 0.466 0 1
CPC member 30034 0.108 0.310 0 1
Father’s years of schooling 30034 4.949 4.454 0 18
Mother’s years of schooling 30034 3.134 4.099 0 18
Father is CPC member 30034 0.134 0.340 0 1
Mother is CPC member 30034 0.027 0.161 0 1
Number of counties = 204
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Table A.3: CGSS: Trust Government Agencies & Policies
Trust PolicyPoor Trust PolicySecurity Trust PolicyCorr
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Exposure 0.011*** 0.027** 0.007** 0.024* 0.013*** 0.028
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.030)
N 8607 8607 8598 8753 8604 8753
Dissention Gov Obidience Gov
OLS IV OLS IV
Exposure -0.003*** -0.008* 0.008** 0.018**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
N 21736 21736 19552 19552
Province FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual Charac. Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Charac. Y Y Y Y Y Y
1
Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
The county-level covariates include all variables introduced in section 1.3.4. The individual-level covariates
include the respondent’s age, gender, ethnicity, religious beliefs, marital status, years of school, employment
status, CCP membership, parental years of schooling and parental CCP membership.
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Table A.4: CGSS: General Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
General trust trust relatives trust colleagues trust people in trust old classmates
the same town
Exposure -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Province FE Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y
Individual Charac. Y Y Y Y Y
County Charac. Y Y Y Y Y
N 3674 21041 19426 20226 19932
1
Robust standard errors clustered at county level in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2
The county-level covariates include all variables introduced in section 1.3.4. The individual-level covariates include the respondent’s age,
gender, ethnicity, religious beliefs, marital status, years of school, employment status, CCP membership, parental years of schooling and
parental CCP membership.
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Figure A.1: Government-Business Innocence Index
Figure A.2: CPoC Nationalism Index
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Chapter 2




What is the inter-correlation between local political tournament and local govern-
ment performance? Theories of democracy suggest that electoral activities promote
both responsiveness and accountability. Increasing empirical evidence shows that in
developed democracies greater political competition generally results in lower levels
of corruption, better incentives for incumbents in o ce (Besley and Burgess, 2002;
Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2010), and a higher provision of public goods. However,
the evidence does not indicate that increases in competition are always beneficial,
or that they would function in all political systems. For example, in autocracies like
China, where local politicians are selected and promoted by the autocrat rather than
⇤I am indebted to my supervisor Paolo Masella for his guidance. I am grateful to Giovanni
Prarolo, Giulio Zanella, Paolo Vanin, Paolo Roberti, Matteo Cervellati, Margherita Fort, Gaetano
Minerva, Pierre Landry, Qi Gao, Xiaobo He for constructive suggestions and the seminar par-
ticipants at University of Bologna, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shanghai University
of Finance and Economics for their comments. Thanks to CSC (China Scholarship Council) for
financial support. All remaining errors are my own.
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the voters, promotion tournaments may lead to a di↵erent relationship between the
levels of political competition and policy outcomes.
The political hierarchical system in China is characterized by two key compo-
nents: economic decentralization and strong political centralization (Xu, 2011; Yu,
Zhou and Zhu, 2015; Persson and Zhuravskaya, 2016). On the one hand, economic
decentralization o↵ers local leaders a great deal of freedom to implement local eco-
nomic policies and to decide whether to provide public goods and services. On the
other hand, political centralization allows higher hierarchically-situated politicians
to provide their subordinates with incentives to adhere to their proclaimed goals,
through their control over the promotion tournament.
The Chinese political tournament, one of the most important parts of the hierar-
chical system, refers to intra-party competition where local politicians on the same
administrative level compete with one other for positions within higher-level author-
ities. The decision to promote local o cials in China is made not by the citizens,
but entirely by the higher-level authority who chooses a winner from the pool of o -
cials based on candidates’ performance, their competence, and their loyalty. Neither
competence nor loyalty is easy to observe practically: upper-level governments usu-
ally look for observable and substantive indicators. The candidates face anecdotally
well-defined promotion criteria that are closely associated with their local economic
performance, mainly measured by local GDP growth rate over their tenure (Chen,
Li and Zhou, 2005; Li and Zhou, 2005). More specifically, relative performance is
assessed by comparing a candidate’s GDP growth with the growth of areas under
the administration of competitors.2 The great economic performance of the Chi-
nese economy in the last decades suggests that the o cials chosen should have been
conducive to growth, or at least not detrimental to local development.
The growth-based promotion mechanism has its advantages and disadvantages.
The career-maximizing behaviors of o cials due to their career concerns are one
of the key drivers of economic growth in China over the last few decades (Maskin,
2This promotion rule stems from historical reasons. Firstly, China has experienced a long period
of poverty, economic growth is a common aspiration of people across the country in a given period.
Secondly, giving priority to e ciency rather to fairness has been a long-term guidance of central
and local government, that the goal of the autocrat is to make the size of the cake larger, to feed
better our 1.3 billion people.
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Qian and Xu, 2000), given the facts that promotion and local economic development
are strongly linked together. A career-focused candidate is motivated to execute
the policies that maximize their career prospects, and strives to boost economic
growth. However, the growth-related career concerns model will inevitably turn
local governments into “production-oriented governments,” leading to rising local
fiscal deficit. Statistics evidence shows that at the end of 2016 the debt ratio of
local governments had reached 36%. The negative impact of promotion tournament
not only appears at this level, but also in the composition of public expenditure:
problems such as excessive investment in infrastructure construction and insu cient
local inputs in education, health care, and other public services are increasingly
prominent. The reasoning behind the unbalanced distribution of public expenditure
is that the promotion process in China rewards investments in construction and
infrastructure, which favor local production directly and immediately. In contrast,
investments in education, health care, and welfare, which have long-term e↵ects
on growth and stability, have been underfunded relative to construction in China,
because they cannot boost economic growth in the short run (Luo, Zhang, Huang
and Rozelle, 2010).
We divide the public input into short-term and long-term investment based on
whether they could increase the productivity of capital in each unit immediately
or not and link them to politicians’ career concerns. For instance, the building of
local infrastructure can be regarded as a short-term investment, because it is able
to motivate local businesses and attract foreign capital, which can raise local pro-
ductivity and boost economic growth rapidly; enhanced growth sequentially benefits
politicians in their competition with one other, within one’s career term, and is a
more reliable signal of a candidate’s competence. Meanwhile, the returns on ed-
ucational and social welfare spending, contributing to long-term public goods and
services for local residents, need time to be materialized and are less advantageous
to a politician’s career.
In this paper, we consider the time-dependent competition level as the source of
variations in career concerns. Using the characteristics of the Chinese political tour-
nament, we measure the level of competition by counting the potential competitors
for promotion in the candidate pool at time t, and by subtracting the prefectures
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whose leader just left the o ce from the total number of prefectures in each province.
We investigate the intercorrelation between political competition and public poli-
cies by analyzing whether and why political competition a↵ects the overall level and
composition of public investments. Specifically, we formalize this research as a simple
career-concerns model with two choices for public input. Following theoretical pre-
dictions, having fewer actual competitors indicates better odds of being promoted,
which work to increase the marginal return on e↵ort. E↵ort refers not only to more
financial input, but also to the strategic allocation of di↵erent contributions: more
investment into short-term projects and less spending on long-term enterprises. In
contrast, more contestants decrease the probability of promotion, which lowers the
spending level and renders long-term pro-social spending more attractive than short-
term investment.
Our paper tests the model by exploring administrative units at the prefecture
level. We combine information on party secretaries with o cial data on prefecture-
level expenditures, by collecting panel data from a sample of 280 prefectures from 23
province-level units3 between 2003 and 2015. The number of potential competitors
comes from the curricula vitae of around 1,000 politicians that worked as prefecture
leaders during the time span of interest; these documents record when a politician was
appointed as well as when and why this politician left his function. An exogenous case
of politicians’ turnover allows us to address the empirical challenge that the number
of competitors is likely to be endogenous. Our estimates explore competitors’ sudden
deaths as an instrument: some candidates left the o ce because they died from a
sudden accident or a sudden illness. Moreover, we employ data from various sources,
including prefecture-level outcomes from o cial yearbooks from di↵erent statistics
bureaus. In this way we explore the e↵ects of career concerns as seen through di↵erent
lenses and check the consistency of the results across various sources as a way of
avoiding data inaccuracy stemming from politically-motivated interferences.
Our findings suggest that a politician’s motivation to pursue growth rises with
decreasing competitors. With fewer potential candidates, more public expenditure
3Except Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai where promotion may focus on securing political stability
instead of growth; Four province-level municipalities are excluded because they are under the direct
control of the state council; The islands Taiwan and Hainan are also excluded.
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is going to be realized. As far as the composition of contributions is concerned,
spending in education and social welfare is shifted to short-term investment, which
immediately leads to more roads and construction projects. When there are too
many contestants for a position, the marginal returns on e↵ort decrease; this is
characterized by decreased expenditures in infrastructure and higher pro-social long-
term spending. In addition, we conduct robustness checks for our main findings,
firstly by allowing for a more flexible estimation of the dynamics of the impact, which
turn out to be discontinuous at the time competitors in the pool su↵ered sudden
death. We also explore another explanatory source as a proxy for the competition
level, namely the number of vacancies in upper-level governments.
Our paper is related to two strands of literature. The first strand studies a critical
issue for political economy - the link between levels of political competition and public
expenditures. On the one hand, a bunch of studies claims that the inter-correlation
is positive. Besley and Burgess (2002) show that higher levels of competition lead to
greater calamity expenditures. Moreover, Besley et al. (2010) apply to the United
States to show empirically political competition has important positive impacts on
the state-level public welfare, claiming that political competition results in lower
levels of corruption and therefore, greater provision of public goods. On the other
hand, the findings are sometimes inconsistent, which depend on certain institutional
conditions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggest that for countries not fully demo-
cratic, the association between political competition and growth-enhancing policies
should be non-monotonic: competition moving from a low to an intermediate level
might results in growth-inhibiting behaviors. Boulding and Brown (2012) and Nye
and Vasilyeva (2015) focus on the impacts of political competition on local provisions
in weak democracies and observe the abovementioned evidence of a non-monotonic
(inverted U-shaped) relationship.
Another strand of literature discusses China’s political tournament, focusing on
the career concerns among o cials at the same administrative level through promo-
tions and demotions. The papers published earlier discuss the positive relationship
between the promotion of local politicians and the growth of areas under their ad-
ministration (Li and Zhou, 2005; Chen et al., 2005). As extensions, scholars start
to look at politicians’ policy choices and behaviors in the performance-based pro-
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motion scheme. Wu, Deng, Huang, Morck and Yeung (2013) provide evidence that
investments on transportation are associated with an immediate increase of GDP
growth, which then is translated to a better odd for promotion. Yu et al. (2015) an-
alyze the strategic response of local politicians to the behavior of their competitors,
showing that Chinese leaders, make public choices depending on their own career
backgrounds through di↵erent career concerns. Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016) find
that “local” leaders who have been working within their province spend a greater
amount of budget on education and healthcare than “outsiders.” Jia (2017) shows
that good connections for provincial o cials lead to more pollutant as a by-product
of their incentives to promote growth.
This paper sheds light on the debate on the relationship between political tour-
nament and political outcomes in authoritarian countries. We try to answer the
debate in the context of a very di↵erent regime, by investigating how the level and
composition of expenditures can vary with the change in the intensity of political
competition. Most related studies demonstrate that the promotion of local o cials in
China is performance-based, and that their professional background relates to their
political behavior through career concerns. This study diverges from the Chinese
political tournament literature by exploring how the environment that politicians
compete in a↵ects their choice of public policy; it argues that the intensity of political
competition is also an important determinant of regional variation in the promotion
of economic growth and in policy-making decisions. Moreover, we introduce a unique
exogenous shock that can a↵ect the competition intensity, namely the competitors’
sudden deaths, to see how this factor changes the outcome of interests.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces briefly the
institutional background and discusses the theoretical intuitions linking the intensity
of political tournament and the level as well as composition of public expenditures.
Section 2.3 introduces the variables and their data sources, while section 2.4 presents
the identification strategy and the baseline results. Section 2.5 further includes
robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
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2.2 Institutional Background
The political tournament in China takes place within a pyramidal administrative
structure defined by dictatorship, which contains five hierarchical levels: the cen-
tral government, the provincial level, the prefecture level, the county level, and the
township governments. Within a single hierarchical level, a fixed pool of candidates
competes for positions in the upper-level authority. The party secretaries, possessing
the ultimate authority and substantial discretion over budgetary policies, are the top
executives and direct candidates in the tournament. Usually the chief and deputy
leaders have to be first promoted to party chiefs and then into the upper-level.4 Our
analysis is limited to the province-prefecture level. The party secretaries at the pre-
fecture level are appointed for five-year terms, but can be promoted at any time as
long as there are positions available.
It is worth comparing the political tournament among the local o cials in China
with the Western-style competition as portrayed by Besley and Case (1995) and
other existing literature. Both cases involve assessment of relative performance, but
the ways in which this is done di↵er. The performance of candidates in a Western
competition is assessed by the voters, reflecting the bottom-up power structure; while
the power structure of competition in China is top-down where a high-level authority
picks winners from a given set of candidates.5 Di↵erent power structure influences
the constraints that the candidates face. Compared to politicians in democracy, who
have limited freedom in the policy decision-making due to the checks and balances
imposed by the legislature, the o cials in China have greater capacities in influenc-
ing the local economy and taking strategic actions. Another important di↵erence,
as well as a main explanation for the strategic behaviors of local o cials, is that, in
a political tournament, only the performances of candidates within the tournament
4The governor/mayor/county magistrate/town chief is the second highest and is subordinated
to the secretary of the communist party along with other chief and deputy leaders including also
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the local People’s Congress, CPPCC Director; Deputy
leaders include vice party secretaries/governors/mayors/county magistrates/town chiefs, and other
members in the standing committee, the total number of seats usually ranges from 11-15.
5Some selected villages in China have undergone transitions to democracy. Martinez-Bravo et
al. (2011, 2012) study the e↵ect of such democratization and find that the village-level elections,
as a direct accountability mechanism, could increase local provision.
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(i.e., prefectures in the same province) but not the performances of contestants out-
side the tournament (i.e., prefectures across di↵erent provinces) will be evaluated
and compared.
To have some brief intuitions linking the intensity of the aforementioned tourna-
ment and the local public expenditures, we start with a principal-agent framework:
the agents are represented by local politicians; the principals in our case are commit-
tees of upper-level government and they have the power to appoint and promote local
o cials. Local o cials’ e↵orts depends on expected probability of being promoted
E(p) = k/n, which is decided by the number of positions for promotion (k) as well as
the number of competing politicians (n). Promotion tournament implies that a local
politician’s promotion depends not only on his or her e↵ort but also competitors’
e↵ort.
We first argue that local contestants exert zero e↵ort when E(p) = 0 or E(p) = 1
(i.e., either everyone or no-one is promoted), because in both cases promotion is not
based on their e↵orts, which indicates that the marginal probability of e↵orts (MPE)
is zero. As E(p) deviates from the two extreme cases, contestants monotonically
increase their levels of e↵orts. Along the continuum of E(p) between zero and one,
contestants exert the greatest e↵ort at a promotion rate p⇤ = 1/2, where e↵ort
yields the highest marginal returns. In the case where the actual E(p) is lower
than p⇤, o cials place less e↵ort since e↵orts are costly with lower marginal returns,
and intangible factors (such as good political connections and luck) turn out to be
critical for a potential promotion. While given that the actual E(p) exceeds p⇤ (i.e.,
probability of promotion is high), o cials also put less e↵ort, since marginal costs of
e↵orts are rising and only intangible elements (such as poor political connections and
bad luck) stand in their way of getting promotion. If k is fixed, then the promotion
rate solely depends on the number of o cials competing in the pool (n), and there
should thus be an inverse U relationship between the number of o cials and their
e↵orts. For the case that there is only a small part of politician could get promoted
(i.e., E(p) < 1/2),6 with an additional contestant (n to n+ 1), the MPE decreases.7
The fundamental assumptions of this tournament is that performance is mea-
6This assumption is reasonable given that the mean promotion rate is 9% in our data.
7See Appendix B.1 for a complete model and formula derivations.
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sured and evaluated based on economic outputs (Li and Zhou, 2005), and politicians
welcome more expenditures, particularly constructive inputs in their regions when
they have incentive to promote growth. In this setting, e↵orts are strongly related
to behaviors that boost local economy and are therefore, approximated by both the
total budget and the re-allocation of resources from long-run input to short-run in-
put. When the MPE decreases, the marginal returns of both two aspects of e↵orts
drop.8 Therefore, a larger pool of competitors reduces the total expenditures as well
as the investment. Politicians with more rivals would implement policies that, intu-
itively, mixed with policies desired by the prefecture inhabitants, since lower odds of
promotion strengthens their attachment to their current position. While a smaller
set of competitors, i.e., any exogenous event that decreases the size of pool (i.e., an
increased MPE) makes local o cials’ e↵orts more profitable. With higher expected
chance of getting promoted, prefecture leaders have excessive need to signal their
competence and to ascertain their loyalty toward higher-level authority aiming to
exceed growth.
2.3 Variables and Data
2.3.1 Competition Level
Spatial and temporal heterogeneity in candidate pools allows us to measure the
competition level by using the actual number of competitors of the leader in prefec-
ture i. We look at the e↵ective number of competitors for provincial Politburo at
the beginning of time t, depicted as Compit in the model.
The intensity of political competition is primarily defined by the number of con-
testants in the pool, which depends on the number of prefectures in province p,
denoted as Mp,t, where one prefecture has one party secretary. Regarding varia-
tions across time,9 if a politician does not serve as a party secretary anymore and
decides to leave the prefectural o ce, we consider that there is a turnover in this
8See Appendix B.1 for a complete model and formula derivations.
9It is important to note that the number of prefectures may change due to the foundation of new
prefectures, a decision which is made by the central government; however, variations are generally
very small.
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position (i.e., the dummy T is given the value of one). The reason for their leaving
can vary, from accidental death, to retirement, promotion or demotion, being caught
doing illegal activities, resignation etc. Importantly, when this position is occupied
by another politician, a turnover of that prefecture occurs. Given that newcomers
are usually unable to get promoted in their first year of taking o ce,10 we do not
consider newcomers to be viable candidates for promotion at time t. Therefore, we
can subtract the prefectures whose leaders left their o ce at time t   1 from the
whole pool Mp,t, as a way of creating variations in competition levels across time.
It is worth emphasizing that, since we are studying how competitiveness a↵ects
an individual’s choice, we are interested in how many actual competitors the leader of
prefecture i is faced with. Thus the measurement of the competition level experienced
by the leader of prefecture i should contain the total turnover rate
P
j Tj 6=ip,t 1 at the
end of t 1, (i.e., in the beginning of t) of all his competitors, where subscript j refers
to any other prefecture in province p besides i. The actual number of competitors
in prefecture i at the beginning of time t equals: Compip,t = Mp,t  
P
j Tj 6=ip,t 1
The competition level is not only time-variant within prefectures but also time-
variant for each politician. It allows the estimation conditional on politician fixed
e↵ects to deal with a concern regarding endogenous appointments of o cials is that
aggressive politicians are likely assigned to provinces with high or low competition
levels.
2.3.2 Instrumental Variable
Instead of summing up all the turnovers of contestants, we pick and sum up
the cases where competing politicians left because they died, as a way of creat-
ing our instrumental variable. To make sure that the events are entirely exoge-
nous and unforeseeable, we take into account only accidental deaths and sudden
illnesses. Accidental deaths include death in a car accident, in an earthquake,
drowning, and any other kinds of accidents. We further include sudden illnesses
such as experiencing a heart attack, having cardiovascular disease, and other acute
10It is possible for the mayor to be temporarily as secretary after secretary’s leave, and then to
get promoted in the same year to provincial Politburo, but such case happens no more than 10 in
our dataset.
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diseases. The mathematical expression of the exogenous variable can be written as
CompDeathip,t =
P
j Deathj 6=ip,t 1, which only includes the turnover rate of the pre-
vious year driven by a rival’s sudden death. An example is shown in the Appendix
Figure B.2.
This exogenous shock is still under-researched in the literature. Jone and Olken
(2009) report that the outcome of an assassination attempt, regardless of whether it
is successful or not, can influence political institutions. Gao, Gilbert and Sylwester
(2013) confirm that the findings of Jone and Olken (2009) are robust. However,
since assassinations of prefecture leaders are rare and attempts are generally unob-
servable, we are only investigating the deaths caused by unpredictable factors. With
these unique variations we aim to capture the exogenous changes in the number of
competitors, in order to solve a potential endogeneity problem, as we explain later
on.
2.3.3 Politician Data
We combine information on party secretaries and o cial data on prefecture-level
expenditures by collecting panel data from a sample of 280 prefectures from 23
province-level units over the course of 13 years, from 2003 to 2015; this results in
3,614 prefecture-year observations.
With regard to the politician data, we focus on prefecture-level party secretaries,
who are in charge of most economic activities and have the greatest power.11 We
collect information on the lives of party secretaries between 2003 and 2015. This
information contains biographical data on Chinese leaders at the prefecture level,
including detailed information about their year of birth, place of birth, gender, eth-
nicity, education history, and job history, as well as the list of past positions held in
the government, along with the period during which each position was held. From
this job history, we are informed about when they leave an o ce and about their
further career path. This dataset is created by digitalizing the prefecture-level party
secretaries’ curricula vitae published on Baidu Wikipedia12 and Local Leadership




The dataset tells us how many prefecture leaders remain employed in each year,
how many leave, and why some leave. From this, we generate data for our explana-
tory variable of interests Compip,t. Its mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum values are shown in Table 2.1. Although in our dataset there are only 42
cases of politicians dying while in o ce, since we are investigating other’s death and
if one politician died, all of the rivals of a deceased politician get a one as their value
for this variable.14 The mean of CompDeathip,t is 0.15, with 534 non-zero cells. This
means that we are actually not too worried about the variations in the instrumental
variable. From the descriptive statistics we know that the average size of a candi-
date pool is around 11 contestants, that on average 23% of party secretaries leave
the o ce after a year (i.e., the turnover rate), and that 6% of this turnover rate can
be explained by accidental deaths. Politicians’ personal characteristics are used as
control variables; these include age, gender, ethnicity, education level, working year,
and whether they are originally from the province governed (i.e., local), information
of which is also presented in Table 2.1.
2.3.4 O cial Data
We are interested in both the level and the composition of public spending allo-
cated to each kind of provision in each prefecture. We aim to capture the trade-o↵
in public spending: whether a marginal unit of Yuan from the budgetary funding
is spent on infrastructure investments or on public provisions such as education
and healthcare. In particular, we define the expenditures on construction of roads,
railroads, bridges, and real estates, agriculture, forestry, and water a↵airs as infras-
tructure investments, and the expenditures on education, scientific research, and
social welfare as public goods spending. We check these four large categories of
expenditures in each prefecture i and year t.15
The sources used for these data are the Financial Yearbooks of each prefecture,
available between 2004 and 2016. The data presented in the yearbooks are the
13http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/firstPage.htm
14In the Appendix B.2, we will show an example of how these variables are computed.
15The expenditure data are available only for large categories.
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amount of expenses (in 10,000 Yuan) from the balance sheets of the prefectures.
After converting the measurements to Yuan, we focus on the logs of the outcome
variables as a way of reducing the influence of large values. The mean and standard
deviation for the log of total expenditures are 13.84 and 0.97, respectively, whereas
those for the log of infrastructure, log of education, and log of social security are
11.77 and 1.19, 11.94 and 1.15, and 11.04 and 1.39, respectively. Summary statistics
are presented in Table 2.1.
Besides the expenditure, there are other variables of interest such as the estab-
lished road and construction areas, and the number of teachers, schools, and hospital
beds in each prefecture between the years 2003 and 2015, which are also gathered
from the China City Yearbook, and are used as outcome variables. To control for
a variety of socio-economic factors, we use o cial information on the local tax rev-
enue, the GDP growth rate, the log of GDP per capita, the log of the population,
the unemployment rate, and the log of wage per capita. These lagged variables are
gathered from the China City Yearbook for the years between 2004 and 2016. This
yearbook is sponsored and edited by the National Bureau of Statistics, which con-
firms that the data is fully reliable, and even if measurement errors might exist, these
should be biased towards the same direction. The mean and standard deviation of
the covariates are shown in Table 2.1.
2.3.5 Empirical Support for the Assumptions
Our hypotheses have several implications and are testable by computing inter-
correlations between variables. A key assumption for our model specification is that
the competitor level, measured by Comp should systematically change the probability
of promotion. Anecdotal evidence suggests that more viable competitors lead to a
lower likelihood of promotion, as the assumption (b) in Appendix B.1 suggested. To
formally test such anecdotal evidence, we regress a dummy variable for promotion on
the number of competitors. The definitions of promotion vary across studies (Tao,
Su, Xi and Zhu, 2010). In our setting, promotion for the secretarial position refers
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to becoming a provincial Politburo member.16
Table 2.2 presents the results on promotion using party secretaries data between
the years 2003 and 2015. We use politician-year observations, in order to capture
the correlation between immediate competition level and promotion outcome when
the final decision to the o cials is going to be made.17 Columns (1) and (2) of Table
2.2 shows that the number of contestants negatively correlates with a promotion
decision. While the estimate is not very precise, the size of inter-correlation is large:
one more competitor corresponds to the probability for promotion by around 2%
whereas the rate of promotion over all decisions is around 30%18 and the average
number of competitors is ten. Second, our instrumental variable, sudden deaths of
competitors, should also have e↵ects on promotion only through the changes in the
number of competitors. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of IV specification,
that one more competitor drops the odds of promotion by around 7.5-9%. Columns
(5) and (6) show the reduced-forms that one competitor death raises the probability
for promotion by around 7-8.5%, with very similar magnitude but di↵erent sign
comparing with columns (3) and (4), since one competitor death would cause the
number of competitors decreases by one. Given the mean of CompDeath is around
0.15, the size of the e↵ect becomes precise, reasonable and interpretable. Controlling
for politician’s characteristics and political performance, which is approximated by
mean GDP growth rate across tenure, does not alter the impacts.
Another issue to be addressed is whether the focus on growth can translate into
a potential promotion. Table 2.3 examines how the promotion decision is a↵ected by
growth and public inputs, as well as the interactions of the levels of competition and
these factors. Column (1) of Table 2.3 tests assumption (a) in Appendix B.1 and
shows that mean GDP growth across tenure is correlated positively with the pro-
motion probability - one percentage point increase in average GDP growth increases
the promotion rate by about 0.5%. This finding is in line with the argument of Li
and Zhou (2005) and Jia (2014). It remains consistent when we use GDP growth of
16When we change the definition of promotion, by including the promotion to vice-chairmen of
the Provincial People’s Congress and vice-chairmen of the Provincial Committee of the People’s
Political Consultative Conference, the results remain robust.
17Hence each politician appears only once in politician-year observations
18The mean of promotion in prefecture-year observations is 0.09 instead.
79
previous year or conditional on competition level and other politician-level controls.
Column (2) reports the regression with the interaction term and presents that the
interaction e↵ect is significantly negative. It fits the assumption (c). This finding
suggests that a higher level of competition (i.e., a more crowded candidate pool)
dilutes the marginal benefits of economic performance (i.e., e↵orts) on promotion
decision.
To further explore how the di↵erent policies involve in the career-maximizing
choice, we examine how promotion rate depends on the policy outcomes to test the
assumptions (d) and (e) in Appendix B.1. We provide evidence in column (3) that
politicians’ spending on infrastructure since assuming o ce strongly correlates with
a higher probability for promotion, through an increased GDP growth rate driven by
those short-term projects; while other kinds of spending do not show this pattern.
The level of significance of the interaction term in column (4) indicates when n is
higher, inputting in infrastructure has a smaller marginal benefit. Consistent with
Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016), columns (5)-(8) generally indicate the promotion
mechanism does not reward consumption of education and healthcare, which trans-
lates into economic growth only in long run, therefore unrelated to promotion. These
findings are consistent with promotion based on the economic performance across the
tenure of the secretaries, and reveal what performance matters for the future career.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Identification Strategy
Our main task is to estimate the e↵ect of the competition level, as measured
by the e↵ective number of competitors, on policy outcomes. We estimate the fixed
e↵ects model based on a panel data as follows:
Yip,t =  Compip,t +Xit  +  i +  t +Ri t + ✏ip,t
where Yip,t represents the budgetary outcome in prefecture i of province p during
year t. Furthermore,  i represents the prefecture fixed e↵ects;  t stands for year fixed
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e↵ects; Compip,t represents the competition level exposed by prefecture i, approxi-
mated by the actual number of competitors faced by politicians in prefecture i at the
beginning of year t; Xit is a rich set of control variables, which include the lagged
prefectural socio-economic characteristics (i.e., the log of the fiscal revenue, the log
of the population, the GDP growth rate, the GDP log, the unemployment rate, the
log of wage per capita, and politician’s characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity,
educational level, working experience in years, and whether they are originally from
the province governed.) Meanwhile, the regional-specific trends are controlled for
by adding region ⇥ year fixed e↵ects, where regions are divided into Eastern, West-
ern, and Central region. Controlling for region ⇥ year fixed e↵ects is a flexible way
of considering the implementation of macro policies during our time horizon. The
standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level.19
Some identification issues need to be addressed here. The first challenge is endo-
geneity, which arises when there are omitted, time-variant variables that are simul-
taneously associated with both the number of turnovers and the expenditure level,
even though we have already controlled for a number of possible confounding fac-
tors. It is worthwhile to address that the direction of the bias is not obvious, and
it depends on the correlation between outcome variable Y and the probability of
politicians remaining in their position as prefecture leaders (i.e., 1 - probability of
promotion - probability of demotion). Similarly, endogeneity also arises when policy
outcomes a↵ect the switches between low and high competition levels. Besides this,
the prediction on endogenous turnover rates and manipulated competition levels may
lead to biased results.
To deal with these concerns, we employ an instrumental variable approach. In
the first stage, we regress the number of competitor deaths on the e↵ective number
of competitors. The e↵ect should theoretically be -1, meaning that one competitor
death results in a unitary increase in the turnover rate, and hence one less competi-
tor. A key identification assumption is that the instrument determines policies only
by means of changing the number of rivals. The main challenge to the exclusion
restriction assumption is that an increased turnover rate in the leadership of an area
i may by itself directly change the governance, in addition to changes in others’ com-
19The results remain robust when clustering the standard errors at the politician level.
81
petition level. Besides, the prefecture with turnover is not a↵ected by the change
in competitors. Hence, we exclude from our analysis the prefecture-year observa-
tions where the turnover T is one. Finally, our sample consists of 2,946 observations
instead of 3,614.20
A remaining challenge is that politicians with certain characteristics, such as
aggressive or well-connected politicians, may be preferentially appointed to certain
regions, namely to the provinces where the competition level is higher or lower. With
a focus on within-politician variation, this concern is relieved. We use the following
two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the unbiased e↵ect of competition level
on policy outcomes:
Compip,t = ↵CompDeathip,t +Xit⌘ +  i +  t +Ri t + µk + ⌫ip,t
Yikp,t =   \Compip,t +Xit  +  i +  t +Ri t + µk + ✏ikp,t
The subscript i, k indicates prefecture i under the administration of party sec-
retary k. Time-invariant politician features are redundant after the inclusion of
politician fixed e↵ects. We input age squared and tenure squared as a non-linear
variable to avoid such co-linearities.
2.4.2 Baseline Results
Table 2.4 presents the results of the regressions, where the total expenditure is the
outcome variable. Column (1) shows the estimates controlled for prefecture and year
fixed e↵ects. Column (2) includes other covariates. Column (3) further adds regional
trends. The within-prefecture estimates indicate that the number of competitors has
a negative impact on the total expenditure level. All estimates are statistically
significant, indicating that more competitors lower the MPE, hence dropping the
marginal returns on expenditure. Column (4) presents the corresponding results
for the within-party secretary estimation. The magnitudes are close to those of
within-prefecture estimates, and still significant. Slightly higher magnitude for the
within-politician estimates suggest that aggressive o cials are more possibly to be
20Full sample is applied for robustness, but the main findings do not change.
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appointed to more competitive provinces. The results do not change after using
competitor sudden deaths as an instrument in columns (5)-(8), indicating that the
total level of spending decreases by 2-3% when the competition level increases by
one competitor. The increased size suggests that higher local investments lead to a
higher rate of remaining in power (i.e., a lower rate of demotion): OLS estimates
are understated, and IV estimates are around two to three times higher in absolute
value. The results in the first stage are not surprising.
Table 2.5 reports the estimates of the regressions, where the infrastructure expen-
diture is our dependent variable. We investigate both log and percentage increases
in infrastructure spending to check how they are a↵ected by increased competition
levels. The within-prefecture estimates show that one competitor increase results
in around 1.5% decrease in public investments and a 3-4% additional increase rate.
Coe cients obtained by IV have a larger magnitude compared to the OLS estimates,
dropping infrastructure spending by 4-5%, an e↵ect which is not trivial.
Besides the local government’s investment e↵orts, we also look at the actual
outcomes (i.e., realizations) of the spending. Table 2.6 shows the results, with the
variables for the logged length of newly built road and logged new constructions
surface (per 10,000 m2) as the dependent variables. From IV estimates and after
clustering the standard errors, it can be concluded that one more competitor de-
creases the length of new roads built by about 3-5% and decreases the surface taken
by new constructions by around 6%.
In Table 2.7, di↵erent e↵ects are shown with the growth percentage and the log
of education spending as the dependent variables. This category of variables is a
measurement of long-term human capital investment and cannot promote growth
immediately according to our assumptions. In terms of OLS estimates, growth per-
centage of education expenditures are positively correlated with an increase in Comp
by 2-3%, while no significant correlation is found with the logged educational spend-
ing.21 The IV results in Table 2.7 reinforce our OLS finding that an increase in
the competition level does have a significant positive impact both on the level and
21It is biased by an anticipated endogenous turnover rate. For instance, politicians’ predictions
that in the following period there will be an increased rate of retirement may lead to a decrease in
educational spending even though the competition level remains high.
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the percentage increase of education expenditure. In Table 2.8, similar patterns are
shown with other long-term growth variables, such as the logged di↵erence of schools
and the logged di↵erence of teachers.
Table 2.9 reports the impact on spending on well-being and redistribution, by
using the variables of social security spending and logged di↵erence of hospital beds.
The results are similar to those for the educational expenditure: when there is more
competition, politicians will remain for longer in their current position, within which
long-term investments can be materialized and the marginal benefits of benevolent
behaviors are higher.
2.5 Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Dynamic Impact of Deaths
In this section we verify the robustness of the results shown in the previous tables.
First, to deal with the concerns of potential anticipation of the events or confounding
institutional cycles, we follow Jia (2017) and allow for dynamic specifications to
analyze the impacts of competitor deaths.
The reduced form of the equations above captures the average e↵ect of competi-
tor deaths over time. Instead of general average e↵ect, we utilize a more flexible
specification to explore how the outcomes alter in the year, or the years after an
exogenous event. We limit our data to observations that have ever exposed to rivals
deaths within our given period (2003-2015), the number of which now is restricted






⌧= 2CompDeathip,(t0+⌧) +  i +  t +Ri t + ✏ip,t
where t
0
presents the year that politician died in the pool and ⌧ stands for the
number of years before and after t
0
. Estimating a shorter horizon dynamics window,
we use two years before death as default period and check the outcomes in one year
before death, the year of death, the first, second, third year after deaths. To avoid
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the potential cyclic e↵ect due to the party congress, which takes place every five
years, we further control for this political cycles.
The results are reported in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.10. The impact of com-
petitor deaths is observed only in the year that competitor died. The estimate   1
is not significantly di↵erent from zero indicates that anticipating of the accidental
deaths and taking action in advance is not feasible. After deaths happen in the year
t
0







, which are insignificantly di↵erent from zero. These results fit our expectations,
that the e↵ect of competitor’s death on outcomes works only in short-term. The
died competitor will be replaced by another politician soon, who in the next periods,
is able to compete in the pool. This finding suggests that politicians would adjust
their spending quickly, given their average length of tenure is only around three to
four years.22
2.5.2 Another Measurement of Competition Level
In this part we present another measurement of competition level, namely the
number of vacancies. As the theoretical intuitions suggest, when we keep n fixed,
raising the number of vacancies k increases the likelihood of being promoted, there-
fore, encourages the politicians to reallocate in investment. This variable is also
endogenous, and can be instrumented by politicians’ deaths in the provincial Polit-
buro. In the first stage, the sudden death of provincial-level Politburo members
would result in one additional vacancy for promotion.23 This would increase the
probability of being promoted, MPE increases. Hence local o cials switch resources
from long-term to short-term.
Instead of using the number of competitors, Table 2.11 presents the results us-
ing the number of vacancies as our endogenous variable, which is instrumented by
sudden deaths of provincial Politburo members. They also show a significant impact
of the competition level on main outcomes. Columns (1) and (2) support that a re-
22The results in Table 2.10 are visualized in Figure 2.1. The dots indicate the coe cients relative
to   2 and the lines present the 90% confidence intervals.
23As defined previously, this paper considers a promotion occurs if the prefecture leaders are
promoted as Politburo members in provincial government.
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duced competition level would lead to an increase in terms of short-term investment,
measured by government’s infrastructure expenditure and length of the newly-built
roads. On the contrary, from columns (3) to (6), the IV estimates represent a sig-
nificant drop of the long-term expenditures, including educational spending, science
spending, social welfare spending and logged di↵erence of hospital beds, when the
number of vacancies increases.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the question of the inter-correlation between political
competition and political outcomes in an authoritarian regime and analyzes whether
and why the competition levels among local leaders a↵ect policy decisions in China.
We employ an administrative feature of the intra-party competition to define the
levels of competition, namely we use the number of e↵ective competitors within the
same province to measure competition. Through career incentives, the intensity of
competition plays an important role in local party secretaries’ governance policies.
They reallocate resources from much required public provisions, such as education,
redistribution, and healthcare, towards infrastructure and constructions when the
number of their rivals is small, in order to seize the chance to get promoted. This is
because the promotion welcomes investments in short-term project, but not inputs
in education and healthcare. When exploring variations in competitor sudden death
to obtain unbiased estimates, the evidence does not change.
However, we are aware that some characteristics of the Chinese regime may be not
generalizable to all autocracies. Compared to other countries, the one-party rule of
China facilitates the monitoring of local agents, making o cials more accountable to
the autocrat’s needs. Regimes that lack a supervisory authority may struggle to build
a link between economic growth and the careers of local agents. The administrative
structure in China is organized in such a way as to have an impact on the policy
decision of local o cials, and this is in contrast to the organization of democracies
where greater political competition increases outcomes which favor one’s career.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variables Obs. Mean S.D Min Max
Outcome Variables
log(Expenditure) 3614 13.84 0.97 10.57 17.38
log(Infrastructure) 3614 11.77 1.19 4.19 14.64
log(Education) 3614 11.94 1.15 4.89 15.02
log(Social Security) 3614 11.04 1.39 5.85 14.55
Main explanatory variables
Num. of competitors 3614 10.86 3.95 0 21
=Num. of prefectures-competitor turnovers
Competitor deaths 3614 0.15 0.37 0 2
(i.e., 534 cells has a non-zero value)
Competitor turnovers 3614 2.50 1.94 0 9
Prefecture-level control variables
log(Revenue) 3614 12.81 1.36 7.85 17.08
log(Population) 3614 5.84 0.66 2.77 7.12
GDP growth rate(%) 3614 12.52 4.70 -19.38 29.94
log(GDP) 3614 15.74 1.05 12.39 19.01
Unemployment rate(%) 3614 0.62 0.53 0.04 11.54
log(Wage per capita) 3614 10.02 0.61 2.28 12.67
Politician’s characteristics
Age 3614 52.401 3.658 39 72
Tenure 3614 3.186 1.753 0 9
Experience 3614 32.932 5.006 15 59
Education 3614 18.261 2.037 12 24
Male (Yes=1, No=0) 3614 0.959 0.199 0 1
Minority (Yes=1, No=0) 3614 0.066 0.249 0 1
Local (Yes=1, No=0) 3614 0.043 0.202 0 1
Performance (average GDP growth rate) 3614 14.36 7.53 -11.5 29.94
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Table 2.2: Empirical Support for the Model Assumptions I
Promotion (1=Yes, 0=No)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV Reduced-form
Competitor -0.017* -0.022** -0.090** -0.075*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.045) (0.044)
Competitor Death 0.084** 0.069*
(0.035) (0.036)
First Stage
Competitor Death -0.916*** -0.948***
(0.129) (0.136)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 957 888 953 874 957 888
1 Promotion is a dummy indicating that a secretary becomes a provincial Politburo member.
Controls include his age, gender and ethnicity, his education, his working experience (year),
whether he is from the province he governs, and political performance (measured by average
GDP growth rate since assuming o ce).
2 Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.3: Empirical Support for the Model Assumptions II
Promotion (1=Yes, 0=No)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
















Competitor -0.045*** -0.016*** -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 3643 3570 3377 3412 3435 3435 3442 3442
1
Promotion is a dummy indicating that a party secretary becomes a provincial Politburo member. Mean GDP Growth indicates average
of annual growth since assuming o ce. Mean Infra. Growth Mean Edu. Growth and Mean Soc. Growth measure the average annual
growth of infrastructure investment, educational investment and social welfare spending during tenure. Controls include his age, gender
and ethnicity, his education, his working experience (year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.4: Impact of Competition on Total Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
Competitor -0.010** -0.010** -0.009 -0.015* -0.022* -0.023* -0.031** -0.035**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
First Stage
Competitor Death -0.965*** -0.945*** -0.881*** -0.755***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.060) (0.099)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Trends Y Y Y Y
Politician FE Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 2897 2684 2684 2684 2897 2684 2684 2684
1
Controls include lagged prefecture’s socio-economic characteristics: log revenue, log population, GDP growth rate, log GDP, unemployment rate,
log wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education, his working experience (year), whether he is
from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.5: Impact of Competition on Infrastructure Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
Infrastructure Expenditure (log)
Competitor -0.013** -0.017*** -0.011** -0.015** -0.041* -0.048** -0.010 -0.043**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
Infrastructure Expenditure (% growth)
Competitor -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.045** -0.137*** -0.147*** 0.147*** -0.150**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.052)
First Stage
Competitor Death -0.965*** -0.945*** -0.881*** -0.755***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.060) (0.099)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Trends Y Y Y Y
Politician FE Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 2883 2656 2656 2656 2883 2656 2656 2656
1
Controls include lagged prefecture’s socio-economic characteristics: log revenue, log population, GDP growth rate, log GDP, unemployment
rate, log wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education, his working experience (year), whether
he is from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.6: Impact of Competition on Other Short-term Pro-growth Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
Road
Competitor -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.019** -0.039** -0.041** -0.030 -0.049*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026)
Construction
Competitor -0.011** -0.012** -0.014*** -0.025** -0.041 -0.050* -0.069** -0.058*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Trends Y Y Y Y
Politician FE Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 2567 2409 2409 2733 2567 2408 2408 2733
1
Controls include lagged prefecture’s socio-economic characteristics: log revenue, log population, GDP growth rate, log GDP, unemployment rate,
log wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education, his working experience (year), whether he is
from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the party secretary level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.7: Impact of Competition on Education Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
Education Expenditure (% growth)
Competitor 0.026** 0.028** 0.021* 0.018* 0.066*** 0.077*** 0.069* 0.067
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.026) (0.029) (0.040) (0.020)
Education Expenditure (log)
Competitor -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
First Stage
Competitor Death -0.950*** -0.929*** -0.865*** -0.755***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.060) (0.099)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Trends Y Y Y Y
Politician FE Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 2885 2735 2735 2735 2882 2734 2734 2734
1 Controls include lagged prefecture’s socio-economic characteristics: log revenue, log population, GDP growth rate, log
GDP, unemployment rate, log wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his educa-
tion, his working experience (year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2 Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the party secretary level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.8: Impact of Competition on Other Long-term Pro-growth Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
Schools
Competitor 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.020 0.033* 0.041** 0.042 0.054
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.019) (0.023) (0.029) (0.112)
Teachers
Competitor 0.014** 0.016** 0.013* 0.020** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.046** -0.050**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022)
First Stage
Competitor Death -0.950*** -0.929*** -0.865*** -0.755***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.060) (0.099)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Trends Y Y Y Y
Politician FE Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 2884 2766 2766 2766 2884 2766 2766 2766
1 Controls include lagged prefecture’s socio-economic characteristics: log revenue, log population, GDP growth rate, log
GDP, unemployment rate, log wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education,
his working experience (year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2 Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the party secretary level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.9: Impact of Competition on Well-being
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
Social Security Expenditures
Competitor 0.008* 0.010** 0.002 0.012* 0.028* 0.037* 0.023 0.035*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.023)
Hospitals
Competitor 0.007** 0.006** 0.004 0.012** 0.018* 0.024** 0.022 0.028**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
First Stage
Competitor Death -0.950*** -0.929*** -0.865*** -0.755***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.060) (0.099)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Trends Y Y Y Y
Politician FE Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 2881 2675 2675 2804 2878 2675 2675 2804
1 Controls include lagged prefecture’s socio-economic characteristics: log revenue, log population, GDP growth rate, log
GDP, unemployment rate, log wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education,
his working experience (year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2 Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the party secretary level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.10: Robustness Checks: Dynamic Impact of Competitor Deaths
(1) (2) (3)
Infrastructure Education Social security
1 year before CompDeath 0.008 0.006 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
The year of CompDeath 0.014** -0.008* -0.007**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
1 year after CompDeath -0.002 0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
2 year after CompDeath -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
3+ year after CompDeath -0.007 -0.014 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y
Controls and Regional Trends Y Y Y
#clusters 253 253 253
#observations 1572 1572 1572
1 The outcomes are the share of infrastructure/education/social security expendi-
tures over total expenditures.
2 Controls include lagged prefecture’s socio-economic characteristics: log revenue, log
population, GDP growth rate, log GDP, unemployment rate, log wage per capita;
and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education, his
working experience (year), whether he is from the province he governs.
3 Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the party secretary level.
Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.11: Robustness Checks: Alternative Measurement of Competition Level
IV
short-term long-term
Infra. Spend. Roads Edu. Spend. Science Spend. Social Welfare Hospital beds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of Vacancies 0.040** 0.061*** -0.021* -0.042** -0.039** -0.012*
(0.018) (0.016) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.007)
First Stage
Polit. Mem. Death 0.985*** 0.988*** 0.985*** 0.987*** 0.985*** 0.986***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Prefecture and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls and Regional Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279
N 3321 3263 3319 3318 3325 3318
1 Controls include lagged prefecture’s socio-economic characteristics: log revenue, log population, GDP growth rate, log GDP, unem-
ployment rate, log wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education, his working experience
(year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2 Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the party secretary level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Figure 2.1: Dynamic Impact of Competitor Deaths on Outcomes
101
Appendix B.1: Theoretical Framework
This part describes a theoretical framework of competition level and policy choices,
which guides the empirical specifications. We set up a contest model which is charac-
terized by the inclusion of two public inputs and examine the response of a politician
in making two choices: one is on total budget, while another is on the allocation of re-
sources between short-run input and long-run input; the variation in career concerns
is considered and modeled by the di↵erent size of candidate pool.
Promotion Incentives The model consists of n candidates competing for k po-
sitions. From Lazear and Rosen (1981), Gibbs (1995) and Karachiwalla and Park
(2017), to be selected a politician must place kth or higher, namely beating at least
n k politicians in pair-wise comparisons. The performance q consists of real output
y and luck ✏. The probability that leader of the prefecture i beats leader of the
prefecture j equals:
pr(qi > qj) = pr(yj + ✏j < yi + ✏i)
= G(yi + ✏i)
To placing exactly gth from the top out of a pool of n contestants, one must beat
n g opponents and lose to g 1 opponents. The probability of promotion conditional
on i’s luck ✏i is the sum of the conditional probabilities of being first through kth.










When p = 0 or 1 (k = 0 or n) (i.e., either everyone or no-one is promoted) p is
constant and the marginal probability of e↵ort (MPE, hereafter) is zero. Nobody
has an incentive to compete. To solve for the MPE we define  = G(y + ✏) and










 n k 1(1  )k 1f(G 1( )  y)d 
Optimal y is determined by the Nash equilibrium in which each politician exerts
output anticipating the output of his or her competitors (which a↵ects G). Consider
the case in which competitors’ output is fixed and when the variation in optimal
output is relative to the variation in luck ✏. The MPE is a weighted sum of the Beta
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density values. If the promotion rates are less than 1/2,  (k, n  k) is skewed to the
left, a candidate would need a high draw of luck in order to be promoted; when n
increases, fewer politicians will be promoted and high draws of luck are less likely,
i.e., f(G 1( )) decreases. Therefore, with an additional contestant (n to n + 1),
while holding the number of vacancies fixed (k), the MPE decreases for p < 1/2, and
vice versa. We have:
(a) @p/@y > 0 (promotion positively correlates to the output);
(b) @p/@n < 0 (promotion negatively associates with the number of competitors);
(c) @2p/@y@n < 0 (MPE decreases with more competitors) when p < 1/2.
These assumptions will be tested empirically in section 2.3.5.
Input and Output Following Cai and Treisman (2005), we define Ii as govern-
ment i’s short-term infrastructure investments. Infrastructure is interpreted broadly,
that it represents spending aimed at raising the productivity of capital in the units,
and contains transportation, telecommunications, etc. For simplicity, we assume
the immediate output is only a function of short-term investments and define it
as yi = f(Ii) (f 0(I) > 0, f 00(I) < 0). Therefore among the di↵erent types of ex-
penditure, only current infrastructure spending but not the educational expenditure
correlates with the promotion odds through immediate economic growth:
(d) @p/@I = @p/@y · @y/@I > 0 (defined as MPI: marginal probability of infras-
tructure investment);
(e) @2p/@I@n < 0 (MPI decreases with more competitors) when p < 1/2.
These assumptions will be tested empirically in section 2.3.5. Another input ci
is interpreted in either of these two ways, one as a share of budgetary funding on
incumbent o cials’ consumption, and another one as expenditures on public goods
and services. O cials obtain extra utility from their consumption or behavior of
benevolence. The utility function v(·) is strictly increasing and concave.
Solution The local o cials maximize the expected benefits minus the cost of bud-
get as follows:
p+ v(c)  C(e)
where p = G(yi + ✏i) is the probability of being promoted, and the benefit from
promotion is normalized to one. C(·) is convex cost functions. The government’s
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budget has been spent in two inputs ei = Ii + ci.







= C 0(e) = MCI (1)
MRc = v
0(c) = C 0(e) = MCc (2)





· f 0(I) (3)
Given that the promotion probability is less than 1/2, the MPE decreases with
raising n, from equation (3) either v0(c) decreases or f 0(I) increases or both (i.e., an
increased c and/or a decreased I). Similarly, from equation (1) C 0(e) will reduce or
f
0(I) raises or both happen (i.e., e and/or I drops). While equation (2), c and e
either both remain fixed, or both change.
Suppose e stays fixed, from equation (1) I has to decrease. Then c has to increase
to maintain the same e. However, from equation (2) change in c would translate to
a change in e. This solution fails to be reached. Therefore, the unique solution in
the model predicts a decrease in e, and a shift from I to c when the MPE decreases
by an exogenous change of n.
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Appendix B.2: Example in Defining Explanatory Variable and Instrument Variable
• Number of prefectures=9
• Two turnovers occur, one because of sud-
den death











Economic spillovers are a common feature of the public goods and services. For
instance, firms and citizens may make use of the public transportation (i.e., roads,
railroads, bridges, etc.), facilities and services in their neighboring jurisdictions; ed-
ucational expenditures and job training provisions can result in productivity gains
outside the unit. However, local jurisdictional boundaries often do not coincide with
the locus of the e↵ects of local economic activities. Because of this, the horizontal
separation of authorities over local public decisions reveals discontinuities, raising
concerns that the spending of one jurisdiction can a↵ect the growth in other jurisdic-
tions, and thus extend its e↵ects beyond jurisdictional boundaries. Therefore these
spillovers, particularly the spillovers in local provisions, have played an important
role in political economy literature on local governments.
⇤I am indebted to my supervisor Paolo Masella for his guidance. I am grateful to Ming-Jen
Lin, Kevin Milligan, Tzu-Ting Yang for constructive suggestions and the seminar participants at
Academia Sinica for their comments. Thanks to CSC (China Scholarship Council) for financial
support. All remaining errors are my own.
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The related literature focuses on spillovers from decentralized local expenditures
and discusses how governments can theoretically change the overall provision of pub-
lic goods in the presence of spillover (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986; 1992;
Bloch and Zenginobuz, 2006). The theory indicates that, in the case of symmetric
spillovers, an increase in spillovers reduces the total provision of public goods.
However, the spatial interdependence of local provision can be empirically ex-
plained by various e↵ects stemming from non-cooperative behaviors such as spillovers,
tax competition, and yardstick competition/mimicking. The pure spillover e↵ects in
a yardstick competition can hardly be disentangled (Case, Rosen and Hines, 1993;
Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli, 2003; Ollé, 2005). Abundant evidence suggests
that, in the presence of competition among local governments, the observed positive
spatial dependence between the level of spending and taxation decisions is unlikely
to be driven by spillover; rather, it seems to be consistent with the yardstick compe-
tition hypothesis and with strategic considerations.
However, quite little literature pays attention to the border e↵ects of politics,
i.e., how local governments geographically allocate public resources in response to
spillovers, and the corresponding consequences which a↵ect the border regions. Lip-
scomb and Mobarak (2017) examine the border e↵ects of pollution and find that
the amount of pollutant raises as a river approaches the downstream exit bound-
ary. The reason for this is that the local authorities are well aware of the negative
spillover e↵ects of pollution, and thus allow more settlements to develop close to the
downstream boundaries of their counties.
Following Lipscomb and Mobarak (2017), instead of looking at the level of inputs,
this paper focuses on local politicians’ response to spillovers, by examining the border
e↵ects on local inputs (i.e., public goods) and outputs (i.e., economic growth). This
paper also aims to depict the features of the distribution of public goods and those of
the economic development within each jurisdiction that is in a yardstick competition.
In the context of an authoritarian political system, which is based on yardstick
competition and relative performance evaluations (RPE), as studied by Lazear and
Rosen (1981) and Shleifer (1985), local o cials are incentivized to engage in a
growth-enhancing policy experimentation (Maskin, Qian and Xu, 2000; Callander
and Harstad, 2015). The tournament is essentially an analogical zero-sum game
where only a limited number of local politicians can get promoted, and the promo-
tion of an o cial directly reduces the chances of others being promoted (i.e., the
gain of one politician constitutes the loss of another). The decision is made by the
upper-level authorities who follow their own anecdotal principles in evaluating the
performance of the candidates in the pool. Among those there is the “comparable
areas principle”; according to this, comparing local o cials of regions with similar re-
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sources makes it easier to distinguish the candidates’ e↵ort and their ability to boost
growth from original local endowments. Neighboring units are therefore considered
a perfect example of comparable areas, since adjacent zones usually have a similar
potential for promoting growth, which at the same time makes cross-jurisdictional
spillovers crucial for competition.
Spillovers lead to insu cient incentives for local leaders to make investment deci-
sions that generate considerable positive consequences for neighboring jurisdictions;
an example of such investment decisions are cross-border provisions. Since the ca-
reer of local leaders is positively related to the economic growth they bring relative
to their competitors, cross-border provisions raise the probability of promotion not
only for the provider, but also for the provider’s geographical competitors (i.e., free-
riders). The net political benefit from providing public goods and services around
and across the cross-jurisdictional boundary is o↵set by this undesirable, even nega-
tive e↵ect. Therefore, local decision makers minimize the spillovers into neighboring
jurisdictions by changing the spatial distribution of public inputs.2 Decision makers
thus end up spending more in the geographical center of their jurisdiction while in-
vesting less in its borders, since the spillovers at the border are substantially larger
than those in the center. A shrinking locus of policy e↵ect and an increased border
e↵ect are expected to be observed.
This paper examines how the border e↵ects are consequences driven by political
competition. Its goal is to present evidence that in China local o cials engage in
the political tournament by strategically changing the distribution of public inputs
in a way which minimizes the spillover e↵ects and therefore maximizes their career
perspectives. The identification strategies used allow for variations in competition
level across time. We model this feature by counting the number of neighboring
prefectures that are e↵ective competitors, a value which is defined as the number of
actual rivals competing for promotion in each specific year. This quantitatively equals
the number of neighboring jurisdictions minus the political replacements occurring
in adjacent jurisdictions during that year.
We use prefecture-year panel data, and the study units are 280 prefectures in
China. The baseline findings indicate that, in a given year, if a prefecture neigh-
bors more jurisdictions governed by potential candidates for promotion, the cross-
jurisdictional borders will be less developed relative to the center. The logic behind
this is that the more competing neighbors there are around the border, the more
likely it is that the overall spillover e↵ect from investments and economic devel-
opments results in an increased influence on the political ranking of local leaders,
2Though the level of public inputs may also change, this paper controls for the overall local
government provision, and checks how this distribution alters.
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results in a further decrease in the radius of policy e↵ect, and sequentially in a more
impoverished border. The findings are consistent if we instrument the endogenous
political replacements with politicians’ sudden deaths. Sudden deaths of local of-
ficials in neighboring regions, lead to transitions of neighboring o cials and make
direct competition in that year less likely. This leads to less competition and more
projects with cross-boundary spillovers.
We further test whether the border e↵ects can be adequately explained by a
unique feature of the political tournament among candidates at the prefecture level.
The results suggest that this pattern occurs only for neighboring prefectures within
the same province, but not for those across provinces. Moreover, if the neighboring
jurisdictions have similar economic performances, the corresponding border e↵ect is
even amplified.
A growing line of literature shows that potential competition from candidates or
political neighbors incentivizes the local governments to strategically increase their
e↵orts to promote GDP growth (Lyu and Landry, 2014; Yao and Zhang, 2015; Yu,
Zhou and Zhu, 2016). However, the impact of the competition on the geographic
distribution of public resources, on the subsequent economic development in the
cross-jurisdictional border is mainly unexplored. This paper attempts to fill these
gaps.
It sheds light on the two following prominent features of the Chinese economy.
The first is that, although China’s economy is growing at a rapid rate, the spatial
inequalities have been continuously expanding. From the geographical distribution of
China’s poverty-stricken areas shown in Figure 3.1, we observe that the poor counties
are usually located at the cross-jurisdictional boundaries.3 Some of these cross-border
regions have a high potential for engineering projects, mining, or tourism, yet it seems
that, for some reasons, they have been economically under-exploited for a long time.
The second feature is the considerable heterogeneity in public goods and service
provision within administrative units. Actions taken within a jurisdiction increase
the likelihood that decentralization without inter-jurisdictional coordination would
lead to misallocation of capital and resources across districts (Besley and Coate,
2003; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 brings a
sketch of the institutional background on Chinese political system and local leader’s
career concerns. This part also discusses the theoretical intuitions linking promotion
tournament to border e↵ects on public inputs and economic outputs. Section 3.3
introduces the variables and data sources. Section 3.4 reports the identification
3Geographical determinism does not fully explain the problem of poverty at the borders, since
poverty can still occur on a large scale even when the geographical environment is superior.
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strategy, while section 3.5 presents the empirical results. Section 3.6 concludes the
paper.
3.2 Institutional Background
We first introduce the implications of RPEs for the incentive of local leaders.
Then we present the theories linking promotion tournaments to spatial disparities of
public inputs and economic outputs.
3.2.1 Career Incentives of Local Leaders
The Chinese political tournament follows a five-level pyramidal administrative
structure of a dictatorship.4 We limit our analysis to the province-prefecture level.
Within the prefecture level, a fixed pool of party secretaries, the top executives and
direct candidates in the tournament, competes for positions in the provincial level
authority. The promotion may occur at any time as soon as there are positions
available.
Empirical evidence supports the importance of economic performance as an es-
sential requirement for promotion, and attributes the remarkable economic growth
of Chinese economy in the past decades to RPE (Li and Zhou, 2005; Chen, Li and
Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011; Yao and Zhang, 2015).
However, rather than the absolute term of performance, the ranking of compara-
ble candidates (such as neighbors) plays a more important role in promotion. RPE
applies to the neighboring competitors within the tournament (i.e., prefectures in
the same province), whose performance as measured by GDP is compared.5 How to
interact with these comparable competitors can be another source of incentive for
local leaders.
Politicians are first incentivized to enhance growth, as this is a measurement of
their performance. Overlooking the interactions between politicians in the politi-
cal tournament misses their second important incentive, namely avoiding decisions
that are consciously or unconsciously beneficial to their competitors by minimizing
positive spillovers.
4The central government, the provincial level, the prefecture level, the county level, and the
township governments.
5In contrast, it does not apply to neighbors outside the tournament (i.e., prefectures across
di↵erent provinces), whose performance will not be compared.
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3.2.2 Promotion, Spillovers, and Border E↵ects
The local policymaker in a decentralized decision-making model accounts for the
externalities onto neighboring jurisdictions in a yardstick competition model. In
the yardstick competition with two competitors, the probability of promotion alters,
when the politician takes external e↵ects into account, written as
Pr(yi +  jyj + ✏i > yj +  iyi + ✏j)
It is observed from the equation that a positive economic spillover can turn into a
negative “political spillover” for the politician. If   is large enough, it may change the
political ranking of local leaders. Therefore, politicians are incentivized to minimize
economic spillovers   by strategically distributing the public inputs.
Since the spillover e↵ect ( ) is larger at cross-jurisdictional borders than in the
center, local decision-maker with career-concerns favors a concentrated allocation
of public resources and narrows down the radius of policy e↵ects. We make two
following predictions.
The more competitors there are around the border, the more likely it is that the
spillovers would play a role in the political ranking within the tournament, and the
incentives of the local o cials to develop the cross-jurisdictional borders are even
smaller, leading to an increased border e↵ect.
Projects which produce spillovers benefiting neighboring districts (and therefore,
neighboring competitors) are likely to be invested when (1) there are fewer e↵ective
competitors around the border; (2) the economic performances of the contiguous
regions are substantially di↵erent, so that the spillovers are not crucial to the pro-
motion outcomes.
3.3 Variables and Data
3.3.1 Explanatory Variable
Defining Neighbors One of the critical characteristics of the Chinese political
tournament is that only the performance of neighbors within the tournament, and
not the performance of competitors outside the tournament, will be compared. Since
we focus on the contest among prefecture leaders (i.e., party secretaries) competing
for positions in the province-level government, only prefecture leaders in the same
province are considered competitors. Hence it is necessary to build a single spatial
weights matrix for each province p.
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We use a first-order contiguity spatial weights matrix to measure and count the
neighbors who share the same border within a province. The pre-specified binary
contiguity matrix, W = [wij]
np
ij=1,p is an np ⇥ np matrix that defines the spatial
contiguity between prefecture i and prefecture j in province p, which consists of np
prefectures. Only contiguous jurisdictions have positive weights in between them-
selves. We use the spatial matrix to define and count neighbors, so that we do not
row-standardize the matrix to ease the interpretation of the results.6 The number of
contiguities is exogenous; therefore the spatial weights matrix is strictly exogenous.
An example of the Hebei Province is depicted in Figure 3.2. The jurisdictions
connected with red lines are geographical neighbors whose economic development is
a↵ected by the positive spillovers from one another.
Political Competition The number of contiguities is exogenous but fixed across
time, which prevents yearly variations of political competition. However, we cre-
ate the variations by exploiting the political replacement and counting the number
of contiguous prefectures with e↵ective competitors at time t. If the politician in
neighboring prefecture j does not serve as party secretaries anymore and leaves the
prefectural o ce, we consider that a turnover (replacement) in prefecture j occurs.
Given that newcomers are usually unable to get promoted in their first year of assum-
ing in o ce, we do not consider newcomers to be viable candidates in the tournament
at time t. Therefore, the replacement of leaders results in fewer e↵ective competitors
and therefore, a lower competition level in year t.7 The adjacent viable competitors
account only for those neighboring prefectures without leader’s turnovers, namely
NoTurnoverjt = 1.




to calculate how many neighborhoods of prefecture i are led by potential competitors
in time t. This explanatory variable proxies the competition around the leader of
prefecture i at time t, denoted C. An example of how this variable is generated is
6The interpretation is straightforward: with an additional increase in contiguous neighbors, the
outcomes change.
7Given a certain number of vacancies, a smaller number of e↵ective candidates indicates a lower
competition level in this province p at time t. Another possible explanation is that in the year
when the replacement takes place, the local government with leader replacement implements less
growth-enhancing policy, which contributes to a lower competition level in the pool.
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shown in Appendix C.1.
3.3.2 Instrumental Variable
The reason of politician’s leaving can vary, from accidental death, to retirement,
promotion or demotion, being caught doing illegal activities, resignation etc. It is
endogenous because omitted variables may correlate with both the outcome and the
turnover rate of competitors. We pick the replacement originated from the sudden
deaths of politicians in power to create our instrument variable. If the leader in
prefecture j of the same province left the position at time t (i.e., NoTurnoverjt = 0)
due to accidental death, the dummy Deathjt is assigned a value one, otherwise zero.





which counts the total number of neighboring competitor deaths, and may a↵ect the
concerns regarding spillovers of the leader of prefecture i. In Appendix C.1 we show
an example on the construction of the instrument.
3.3.3 Outcome Variables
This paper focuses on the border e↵ect on economic development and the radius
of public inputs of each jurisdiction. Suppose the distribution of economic activities
or public provisions is as depicted in Figure 3.3, where the zero on the x-axis is the
centroid of the jurisdictions; thus the values on the horizontal axis represent the
radius of the units, and the values on the vertical axis correspond to the provisions
given at particular distances from the central point. To simplify the estimation,
instead of placing the distribution into a regression, we use the center-border ratio
which takes an average of the values in the center as the numerator, and an average
of the values in the cross-jurisdictional borders as the denominator to approximate
the distribution, as shown by the red line in Figure 3.3. All the outcome variables are
written in the form of the following center-border ratio, indicating the distribution
of the outcomes of interest in the jurisdiction i:
Yi =
outcome in the center of jurisdiction i
outcome in the border of jurisdiction i
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Before taking the average in both center and border region, we need to define the
coverage of each zone. Bu↵er by Percentage plugin iteratively finds the bu↵er length
required for resizing polygons to a specified percentage. For baseline estimation,
we take bu↵er polygon based on a certain percent of 25% as the border regions of
each jurisdiction, as shown in Appendix C.2. To demonstrate the robustness of the
results, we also estimate it for 35% 15% and 5% bu↵ers as the border. These results
are upon request.
Economic Development 2005-2013 satellite images of nighttime light from NOAA
allows us to measure yearly border e↵ects on economic development within each pre-
fecture. We create the outcome variable which proxies the distribution of economic
activities of jurisdiction i and is measured by mean luminosity in non-border regions




Larger the ratio indicates less developed the border zones compared to centers, i.e.,
larger border e↵ects on economic outputs.
Public Provisions GIS maps from the National Administration of Surveying,
Mapping and Geo-information of China in the years 2009, 2012 and 2015 make it
possible to capture the distributions of major public inputs, such as roads, schools,
and hospitals. After calculating the density of these inputs, we generate similar ratios
that capture the distribution of inputs within jurisdiction i: density of provisions in
non-border regions over density of provisions in border regions. Larger the ratio
indicates more concentrated the public contributions, i.e. a smaller radius of policy
e↵ect and larger border e↵ects on public inputs.
3.3.4 Dataset
We combine information on party secretaries, data on prefecture-level center-
border ratio based on satellite data and o cial reported data, by collecting a panel
for 280 prefectures from 23 province-level units8 for ten years, from 2006 to 2015,
resulting in 2,800 prefecture - year observations.
8Except Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai where promotion may focus on securing political stability
instead of growth; Four province-level municipalities are excluded because they are under the direct
control of the state council; The islands Taiwan and Hainan are also excluded
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With regard to the politician data, we focus on prefectural party secretaries,
because they are the o cials in charge of most economic activities and with the
greatest power.9 We use a self-collected dataset based on the lives of party secretaries
between 2006 and 2015. It contains biographical data on their year of birth, place
of birth, gender, ethnicity, education history, and job history, as well as the list of
positions held in the party or government in the past, along with the period during
which each position was held. From this job history, we are informed about when
they leave an o ce and about their further career path. This dataset is created by
digitalizing the curricula vitae of prefectural party secretaries published on Baidu
Wikipedia10 and Local Leadership Database11.
The dataset tells us how many prefecture leaders remain employed each year,
how many leave, and why some leave. From this, we infer the replacement status of
each local government every year. Together with the spatial weights matrix, our ex-
planatory variable of interests - the level of competition (C)
Pnp
j 6=i wij,pNoTurnoverjt
is generated. Its mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values are re-
ported in Table 3.1. From the summary statistics, the mean for contiguous competi-
tor death (Dj) is nearly 0.05, with 170 non-zero cells. On average, local politicians
have three e↵ective geographical contestants. Politician’s personal characteristics are
considered as covariates, including age, gender and ethnicity, education and major,
working experience, and whether they are originally from the province governed (i.e.,
local). The summary statistics of these controls are also presented in Table 3.1.
The economic prosperity outcome sources from satellite data. Night-time light
density is reported by an integer scale ranging from 0 to 63, and is available from
the National Geophysical Data Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA) of the US. The information comes from satellite images taken
for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) of the US Department of
Defense. We use the latest version of the satellite data (i.e., Version 4.0) and collect
the values between the years 2006 and 2013. The mean and standard deviation of
the luminosity center-border ratio are listed in Table 3.1.
GIS maps from National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geo-information
of China available for the year 2009, 2012 and 2015 allow us to capture the distribu-
tion of public provisions, such as roads, schools, and hospitals.
The series of lagged prefecture-level covariates are gathered from the China City
Yearbook for the years between 2004 and 2016.12 To control for all possible socioeco-
9The results for mayors are upon request.
10https://baike.baidu.com/
11http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/firstPage.htm
12The Yearbook is sponsored and edited by the National Bureau of Statistics, which confirms
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nomic factors, we select o cial information on the log of fiscal revenue, GDP growth
rate, log of GDP per capita, log of population, unemployment rates, log of wage per
capita. In Table 3.1, the mean and standard deviation of the controls are shown.
3.4 Identification Strategy







it  + ⌘i + ↵t +  p ⇥ t + ✏it
The first-order spatial model is specified as follows: Yit denotes the distribution
of the outcome variables, center-border ratios being its proxy. The main explanatory
variable wij,pNoTurnoverjt, indicates the number of e↵ective contiguous neighbors,
representing the political competition. ⇢ captures the impact of the political compe-
tition on outcomes.
We control for a vector of prefecture-level variables, xit, which vary across time.
These are the turnover rate in jurisdiction i (i.e.,T = NoTurnoverit),13 the lagged
population, the fiscal revenue, the unemployment rate, the log of wage per capita,
the logged GDP, the GDP growth rate, and a set of politician characteristics such as
age, gender, ethnicity, educational level and major, working years, whether they are
originally from the province governed (i.e., local versus outsider). Prefecture fixed
e↵ects, ⌘i, capture regional heterogeneities in resource endowment, cultural features,
and other omitted time-invariant factors. Year fixed e↵ects, ↵t, capture both the
macro-shocks and the policy e↵ects for each period, the omission of which leads to a
spurious e↵ect. We also include regional trends in the model, by adding province ⇥
year fixed e↵ects. The Inclusion of these variables in the regression accounts for the
possibility of regional cooperation driven by policies initiated by the provincial-level
government.
The SLX model is advantageous over other spatial econometrics models since it
could include non-spatial econometric techniques, especially when we have an en-
that the data is fully reliable, and even if measurement errors might exist, these should be biased
in the same direction.
13This term should be explicitly controlled for, not only because it is suggested by settings of
the SLX model, but also as the turnover rate in jurisdiction i is correlated with both politician
replacements in other jurisdictions and the dependent variable. Its coe cient approximates the
direct e↵ect of a local politician’s replacement on their public policies.
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dogenous variable to be instrumented (Vega and Elhorst, 2015).14 To deal with
concerns regarding endogeneity, we employ an instrumental variable approach, by
instrumenting competitor turnover rate with the variable death of competing politi-
cians, as indicated in section 3.3.2. However, variable NoTurnoverit is also endoge-
nous. Based on the assumption that Cov(Deathjt, Deathit) = 0, we employ the
death of the leader of jurisdiction i to instrument its rate of political turnover. Both
e↵ects on the turnover rate should theoretically be close to  1, which intuitively
means that one death of a leader results in one more increase in the turnover rate for
the position. Therefore, we employ the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) re-
gression to estimate the causal e↵ect of competition on policy outcomes, controlling
for the instrumented direct-replacement e↵ect.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 3.2 presents the results of regressions, where the luminosity center-border
ratio is the dependent variable. Column (1) shows the pooled OLS estimate, column
(2) presents result controlled for prefecture fixed e↵ects. To provide a benchmark
we include prefecture and year fixed e↵ect in column (3) before controlling for other
baseline covariates in following columns. Column (4) adds controls while column
(5) further includes regional-specific trends. Column (6) allows within-politician
estimations.
In all cases besides simple pooled-OLS, competition levels, measured by the num-
ber of e↵ective contiguous neighbors, correlate positively and significantly with the
luminosity ratio, indicating an increased border e↵ect on the economic outcome.
As expected, competing with one additional neighboring competitor in certain year
makes the leader more concerned about the economic spillovers, and to be less in-
centivized to develop cross-jurisdictional border. From columns (2)-(6) of Table 3.2,
The ratio increases by 0.7%-0.8%. The politician replacement e↵ects range from
0.9%-1.2%, suggesting that the border e↵ects are higher when there is no bureau-
cratic replacement. This correlation is consistent with tournament theory that at
the beginning or at the end of local leader’s tenure (i.e., when the replacements in
the position occur), politicians have the least incentive to promote solely growth for
promotion, instead they focus more on social welfare and fairness.
14The SLX model allows the Hausman test for endogeneity as well as other tests for the validity
of the instruments to evaluate if they satisfy the assumptions of exogeneity and relevance.
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3.5.2 Instrumented Results
In this part, we instrument the number of e↵ective contiguous competitors (C)
with the number of contiguous competitor death (Dj), and the turnover rate of
jurisdiction i (T ) with leader death of that prefecture (Di), respectively. The results
are shown in Table 3.3.
With regard to the political competition e↵ects, the bias using OLS estimation
goes downwards. The 2SLS estimates of ⇢ are 2-3 times larger than OLS estimates.
Columns (2)-(6) shows that one additional e↵ective competitor in contiguous pre-
fectures leads to a 1.4%-2% increase in the ratio of economic activities. Politician
replacement e↵ects become statistically insignificant when the endogenous variable
is instrumented.15
3.5.3 Public Inputs
Short-term Investments & Long-term Public Provisions We further check
if the increased border e↵ect on economic prosperity is driven by a strategic choice
of public provisions distribution implemented by local leaders.
In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, we change the outcome variables in order to estimate the
impact of competition on the radius of policy e↵ect or the distribution of public
expenditures, again controlling for instrumented replacement e↵ects. The center-
border ratio of road density calculated by ArcGIS indicates the distribution of short-
term investments. While the ratios of schools and hospitals density represent the
distribution of long-term public provisions.
The border e↵ect on road distribution increases with the political competition.
Given the fact that short-run pro-growth programs correlate immediately and strongly
with local economic activities (i.e., proxied by the nighttime luminosity), the direc-
tion of the e↵ect should be as the same as the e↵ect on luminosity ratio shown in
Tables 3.2 and 3.3. From the IV estimation shown in Table 3.4, one more e↵ective
contiguous competitor increases the ratio by 6%-7%, which represents the politician’
15A possible reason is that if a politician is waiting for retirement/ is informed about promotion
or demotion decision, he has the least incentive to pursue solely growth; in this case we observe the
results shown in baseline results, that the replacement is associated with a reduced border e↵ect;
However the instrument, accidental deaths, are unforeseeable. Before the occurrence of deaths, the
local leader was actually competing for promotion and taking spillovers into account. In such case,
the direct e↵ect of turnover rate on policy drops to zero, as the instrumented results show. On the
other hand, the neighboring competitors, who don’t care how and why the replacement in other
areas happens, perceive the competition levels by counting the number of prefectures with potential
competitors, so the e↵ect of competition keeps robust with IV estimation.
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decision on constructing new roads in center instead of border in response to their
greater concerns about spillovers.
However, when using the distribution of schools and hospitals as outcomes in the
regressions, we find that the change of border e↵ect on long-term public expenditure
seems obscure with IV estimation. The competition does not alter the distribution
of schools and hospitals, as suggested by columns (4)-(8) of Table 3.5. Since these
long-term provisions could not a↵ect relative ranking in the pool immediately, the
politicians do not change the distribution of this type of expenditure.
Positive & Negative Externalities This part discusses the case where public
input with negative externalities is the outcome variable, as sort of placebo test. Ac-
cording to the theory above, the border e↵ect on provision with negative externalities
should be stable or decrease. Pollution can be an example of negative spillovers. Air
pollutant data is from Global Annual Average PM2.5 Grids from MODIS and MISR
Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD), v1 (2005-2010). In Table 3.6, the e↵ect of competition
on center-border ratio of pollutants is negative, i.e., more pollutant in the border.
This finding is in line with Lipscomb and Mobarak (2017).
3.5.4 Ranking E↵ect
A corollary of the political tournament theory is that, although cooperation
among local o cials is hard to achieve, it does not necessarily mean that economic
cooperation is impossible in all regions. The key lies in whether economic spillovers
will a↵ect the relative ranking of local o cials. Cooperation may be unlikely to be
achieved among party secretaries with a similar political status, as measured by the
GDP ranking of prefectures. Particularly, the more economically close regions are,
the more uncertain the expected net political return from cooperation is. We classify
three types of neighboring pairs: (1) strong, strong ; (2) strong, weak ; (3) weak, weak ;
this classification is made based on the GDP growth of prefectures within a province.
The border e↵ect should be the lowest for case (2) and relatively high for case (1) and
case (3). strong-weak pairs are usually willing to cooperate because local o cials do
not have to worry that spillovers could change their relative political ranking, so they
have much stronger incentives to jointly develop cross-border resources. However,
for strong-strong or weak-weak pairs the incentive to cooperate is weak.
We define prefectures whose annual GDP is above that of the annual mean GDP
of the province to which they are subordinated as strong regions, and the remaining
ones as weak regions. Then we count the number of strong and weak adjacent
competitors in each prefecture for each year. In Table 3.7, columns (1) and (2)
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report the e↵ect on the strong-strong and strong-weak borders. In the case of strong
prefectures, a border e↵ect is strengthened only if the number of strong contiguous
competitors increases. The variation in weak contestants does not a↵ect the policy
distribution in strong regions. The results for the weak units are shown in columns
(3) and (4), which illustrate the cooperative levels of weak-strong and weak-weak
pairs. Only additional weak neighbors can force a politician in a weak area to alter
their distribution. No e↵ect is observed for the change in strong competitors in
this case. Columns (4)-(8) report the same information, with the IV specifications
included.
3.5.5 Robustness Checks
Within-Province E↵ect When looking at prefectures from more than one province,
the pattern above should not exist, otherwise the pattern would be explained by other
factors rather than by the tournament theory. Distinguishing between the two kinds
of neighborhood disentangles the border e↵ects driven by RPE from the e↵ects of
market interactions, exploiting the features that the RPE operates only within a
province, while the market segmentation does not have such limits.
We select only prefectures that have neighbors from other provinces and create an
across-province weights matrix. Technically, weights matrix identify prefectures that
are geographically proximate, but from di↵erent provinces, as neighbors. We run the
aforementioned regressions again. The results are reported in Table 3.8. The e↵ect
on luminosity center-border ratio is statistically non-significant when investigating
across-province continuities. This finding does not suggest that border e↵ect is zero
at the across-province boundaries,16 but the border e↵ect does not alter in response
to the promotion incentives.
Reduced Forms: Competitor Deaths on Boundary Segment In this part,
the border e↵ect is examined in another way. Instead of using the center-border
ratio, we look at the outcome in a specific boundary segment; therefore, we do not
consider the cross-jurisdiction border of a given prefecture as a whole. Rather, we
divide it into several segments according to the di↵erent bordering jurisdictions of the
prefecture. Then we look at what happens when a leader in a neighboring jurisdiction
dies, namely at how the public inputs change in the specific boundary segment that
connects these two prefectures.
We restrict the sample to the prefectures that have at some point experienced
16Border e↵ect may also come from local protectionism and market segmentation.
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the death of a neighboring competitor. The results in Table 3.9 indicate that, after
controlling for prefecture fixed e↵ects, one neighboring competitor’s death leads to a
0.25-0.3 increase in the density of roads in the boundary segment neighboring with
the prefecture whose leader has just died. From columns (4)-(6) we can observe
that the increase of provisions in the entire boundary zones is mainly driven by
the increase in those specific boundary segments. This finding supports the idea
that, sudden deaths of local o cials in neighboring regions, which lead to turnovers
of neighboring o cials and thus less competition, incentivized more projects with
cross-border spillovers.
Alternative Explanation: Tax Competition One branch of literature links
this unwillingness to cooperate with economic decentralization among regions, which
gives local leaders plenty of leeways to enhance the local economy, causing local tax
competition (Oi, 1992; Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995; Qian and Weingast,
1997; Jin, Qian and Barry, 2005). The tax competition eventually leads to local
protectionism and market segmentation (Young, 2000; Bai, Du, Tao and Tong, 2004).
The cross-jurisdictional borders are exactly the areas where local protectionism and
market segmentation occur. The specialized division of labor and regional trade can
be suppressed, resulting in disruption of the economic development at the border.
However, based on the empirical findings obtained so far, we confirm that tax
competition is not the critical driving factor of the increased border e↵ect. First,
tax competition should be more intensive on cross-jurisdictional boundaries since it
is easier for residents and firms to relocate within these borders. This conflicts with
our intuition that the local government, as a way of being more competitive within
the tax contest, would invest more resources into those areas, since indeed most of
those areas are completely undeveloped and neglected. Second, the ranking e↵ect
findings reported in section 3.5.4, as well as the within-province e↵ects reported in
section 3.5.5 could hardly be explained by the hypothesis of tax competition.
3.6 Conclusion
The paper examines how political competition influences the border e↵ects on
the political outcomes, including public inputs as well as economic outputs. The
underlying assumption is that economic spillovers play a role in the yardstick com-
petition, where the relative performance of candidates is evaluated. Local leaders,
who engage in the tournament, strategically minimize the spillover e↵ects onto the
neighboring competitors in order to maximize the probability of being promoted
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through RPE, particularly when the competition levels of the geographical cluster
are high. We quantify the competition levels by counting the number of e↵ective
contiguous competitors, which allow the variations in competition across time. We
exploit the center-border ratio to proxy the distribution of outcomes within a juris-
diction.
The baseline results suggest that political competition leads to a decreased ra-
dius of policy e↵ect and sequentially a more impoverished border. The findings are
consistent if we instrument the endogenous political turnover rates with politicians’
sudden deaths. We prove that the border e↵ect is driven by the unique feature of
Chinese political tournament, rather than market segmentation and tax competition,
since the aforementioned pattern occurs only for contiguous prefectures within the
same province, but not for those across provinces. Moreover, the border e↵ects are
amplified when the competing neighbors are closer in political and economic ranking.
The findings of this paper suggest that RPE in China is an essential mechanism for
achieving multiple policy goals.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variables Obs. Mean S.D Min Max
Outcome Variables: center-border ratios
Luminosity 2800 0.898 0.297 0.207 2.16
Road density 1030 1.088 0.289 0.067 3.128
School density 689 1.092 0.208 0.164 3.103
Hospital density 692 0.989 0.206 0.007 2.984
Main explanatory variables




# Contiguous competitor deaths (Dj) 3130 0.048 0.215 0 2
(
Pnp
j 6=iwij,pDeathjt, 170 cells has a non-zero value)
Politician turnover (T) 3130 0.1885 0.3912 0 1
(NoTurnoverit)
Prefecture-level controls
log(Revenue) 2792 13.038 1.185 9.549 16.851
log(Population) 2792 5.843 0.659 2.85 7.121
log(GDP) 2767 15.919 0.960 13.014 18.934
GDP growth rate 2763 12.793 3.733 -19.38 37
Unemployment rate(%) 2706 0.612 0.500 0.045 11.544
log(Wage per capita) 2755 10.149 0.499 7.501 12.678
Politician’s characteristics
Age 2743 52.634 3.523 41 61
Tenure 2743 3.419 1.687 0 9
Experience 2705 33.209 5.070 15 58
Education 2760 18.358 2.021 12 24
Male (Yes=1, No=0) 2771 0.958 0.201 0 1
Minority (Yes=1, No=0) 2767 0.067 0.249 0 1
Local (Yes=1, No=0) 2743 0.036 0.187 0 1
Economist (Yes=1, No=0) 2714 0.078 0.269 0 1
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Table 3.2: Border E↵ect on the Luminosity: OLS
DevRatio: Luminosity in Center / Luminosity in Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# e↵. contiguous 0.0146** 0.0070*** 0.0079*** 0.0077*** 0.0072*** 0.0081**
competitors (C) (0.0074) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0032)
politician turnover (T) 0.0397 0.0087** 0.0097** 0.0101** 0.0104** 0.0119*
(0.0285) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.060)
Prefecture FE N Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N Y Y Y
Regional trends N N N N Y Y
Politician FE N N N N N Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 2477 2465 2465 2329 2329 2329
1
Controls include lagged prefectural socio-economic characteristics: log population, unemployment rate, literacy
rate, log wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education and major,
his working experience (year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%.
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Table 3.3: Border E↵ect on the Luminosity: Instrumented Results
DevRatio: Luminosity in Center/ Luminosity in Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# e↵. contiguous 0.2204 0.0179** 0.0137* 0.0166* 0.0143* 0.0201*
competitors (C) (0.1766) (0.0087) (0.0078) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0105)
politician turnover (T) 0.0083 0.0242 0.0190 0.0237 0.0189 0.0219
(0.1356) (0.0198) (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0205) (0.0242)
First Stage
# e↵ective contiguous neighbors (C)
# contiguous competitor -0.2813** -0.8106*** -0.9223*** -0.8689*** -0.8320*** -0.7682***
deaths (Dj) (0.1160) (0.0711) (0.0706) (0.0714) (0.0704) (0.0901)
politician turnover (T)
leader’s death (Di) -0.7078*** -0.7072*** -0.7327*** -0.7324*** -0.7227*** 0.7021***
(0.0493) (0.0483) (0.0508) (0.0511) (0.0521) (0.0715)
Prefecture FE N Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N Y Y Y
Regional trends N N N N Y Y
Politician FE N N N N N Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 2817 2817 2493 2333 2089 2089
1
Controls include lagged prefectural socio-economic characteristics: log population, unemployment rate, literacy rate, log
wage per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education and major, his working
experience (year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3.4: Border E↵ect on the Short-term Inputs
RoadRatio: Road density in Center/ Road density in Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
# e↵. contiguous 0.0200** 0.0190** 0.0189** 0.0207* 0.0613* 0.0684* 0.0715* 0.0720*
competitors (C) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0079) (0.0093) (0.0372) (0.0389) (0.0388) (0.0395)
First Stage
# contiguous competitor -0.7153*** -0.6961*** -0.7074*** -0.6325
deaths (Dj) (0.1206) (0.1230) (0.1212) (0.1379)
Politician turnover Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture, Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Regional trends N N Y Y N N Y Y
Politician FE N N N Y N N N Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 821 796 796 796 821 796 796 796
1
Controls include lagged prefectural socio-economic characteristics: log population, unemployment rate, literacy rate, log wage per capita; and
politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education and major, his working experience (year), whether he is from the
province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3.5: Border E↵ect on the Long-term Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
SchRatio: School density in Center/ School density in Border
# e↵. contiguous 0.0041* 0.0060** 0.0058** 0.0067* -0.0019 -0.0006 0.0018 0.0015
competitors (C) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0141) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0193)
HosRatio: Hospital density in Center/ Hospital density in Border
# e↵. contiguous 0.0029 0.0034 0.0034 0.0067* 0.0051 0.0101 0.0197 0.0115
competitors (C) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0051) (0.0121) (0.0174) (0.0190) (0.0208)
Politician turnover Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture, year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Regional trends N N Y Y N N Y Y
Politician FE N N N Y N N N Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 556 518 518 518 556 518 518 518
1
Controls include lagged prefectural socio-economic characteristics: log population, unemployment rate, literacy rate, log wage
per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education and major, his working experience
(year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3.6: Border E↵ect on the Inputs with Negative Externalities
Pollution: average pm 2.5 in Center/ average pm 2.5 in Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
# e↵. contiguous 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0015* -0.0014* -0.0017* -0.0020*
competitors (C) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Politician turnover Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture, year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Regional trends N N Y Y N N Y Y
Politician FE N N N Y N N N Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 1554 1437 1437 1437 1554 1437 1437 1437
1
Controls include lagged prefectural socio-economic characteristics: log population, unemployment rate, literacy rate, log wage
per capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education and major, his working experience
(year), whether he is from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3.7: GDP Ranking E↵ect
DevRatio: Luminosity in Center/ Luminosity in Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
Strong Weak Strong Weak
# Strong e↵. neighbors 0.0130** 0.0148** 0.0045 0.0053 0.0447* 0.0481* 0.0028 0.0027
(0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0260) (0.0286) (0.0088) (0.0094)
# Weak e↵. neighbors 0.0044 0.0039 0.0083*** 0.0076*** -0.0072 -0.0105 0.0205* 0.0196*
(0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0214) (0.0231) (0.0120) (0.0117)
Politician turnover Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture, year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
#observations 917 885 1548 1483 917 885 1548 1483
1
Controls include lagged prefectural socio-economic characteristics: log population, unemployment rate, literacy rate, log wage per
capita; and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education and major, his working experience (year), whether
he is from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
133
Table 3.8: Across-province Neighborhood
DevRatio: Luminosity in Center/ Luminosity in Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS IV
# across-province neighbors 0.0010 0.0039 0.0051 0.0087 0.0038 0.0139 0.0067 0.0170
(0.0046) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0093) (0.1223) (0.0908) (0.0830) (0.0950)
Politician turnover Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture, year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Regional trends N N Y Y N N Y Y
Politician FE N N N Y N N N Y
#clusters 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
#observations 821 796 796 796 821 796 796 796
1
Controls include lagged prefectural socio-economic characteristics: log population, unemployment rate, literacy rate, log wage per capita;
and politician’s characteristics: his age, gender and ethnicity, his education and major, his working experience (year), whether he is
from the province he governs.
2
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the prefecture level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 3.9: Reduced Forms: Competitor Deaths on Boundary Segment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Roads (Density)
segment contiguous to prefec Whole border
-ture with dead competitor
Contiguous competitor death 0.3160*** 0.3055** 0.2623** 0.2469* 0.3372** 0.4664***
(0.1135) (0.1291) (0.1041) (0.1445) (0.1685) (0.1793)
Politician turnover Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture, year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
Regional trends N N Y N N Y
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Figure 3.1: Spatial Distribution of Poverty-stricken Counties
Figure 3.2: Neighbors in Hebei Province (Example)
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Outcomes and center-border Ratio
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Appendix C.1: Example in Defining Explanatory Variable and Instrument Variable
• Number of contiguities:
=
Pnp
j 6=iwij,p · 1
• Two turnovers occur








Appendix C.2: Border Regions (blue) and non-Border Regions (purple)
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